From: Louis Rilling <Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>,
Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] pids: refactor vnr/nr_ns helpers to make them safe
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 11:35:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090116103522.GA32212@hawkmoon.kerlabs.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090116055520.GA28131@redhat.com>
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Hi Oleg,
On 16/01/09 6:55 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> Inho, the safety rules for vnr/nr_ns helpers are horrible and buggy.
>
> task_pid_nr_ns(task) needs rcu/tasklist depending on task == current.
>
> As for "special" pids, vnr/nr_ns helpers always need rcu. However,
> if task != current, they are unsafe even under rcu lock, we can't
> trust task->group_leader without the special checks.
>
> And almost every helper has a callsite which needs a fix.
>
> Also, it is a bit annoying that the implementations of, say,
> task_pgrp_vnr() and task_pgrp_nr_ns() are not "symmetrical".
>
> This patch introduces the new helper, __task_pid_nr_ns(), which is
> always safe to use, and turns all other helpers into the trivial
> wrappers.
>
> If this patch is acceptable, I'll send another one which converts
> task_tgid_xxx() as well, there are a bit special.
>
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>
[...]
> --- CUR/kernel/pid.c~SP_3_NR 2009-01-16 02:54:26.000000000 +0100
> +++ CUR/kernel/pid.c 2009-01-16 05:40:43.000000000 +0100
> @@ -452,11 +452,24 @@ pid_t pid_vnr(struct pid *pid)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pid_vnr);
>
> -pid_t task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pid_namespace *ns)
> +pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
> + struct pid_namespace *ns)
> {
> - return pid_nr_ns(task_pid(tsk), ns);
> + pid_t nr = 0;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + if (!ns)
> + ns = current->nsproxy->pid_ns;
> + if (likely(pid_alive(task))) {
I don't see what this pid_alive() check buys you. Since tasklist_lock is not
enforced, nothing prevents another CPU from detaching the pid right after the
check.
I'm also a bit puzzled by your description with using tasklist_lock when task !=
current, and not seeing tasklist_lock anywhere in the patch. Does this mean that
"safe" is for "no access to freed memory is done, but caller has to take
tasklist_lock or may get 0 as return value"?
Thanks,
Louis
> + if (type != PIDTYPE_PID)
> + task = task->group_leader;
> + nr = pid_nr_ns(task->pids[type].pid, ns);
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + return nr;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_pid_nr_ns);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__task_pid_nr_ns);
>
> pid_t task_tgid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pid_namespace *ns)
> {
[...]
--
Dr Louis Rilling Kerlabs
Skype: louis.rilling Batiment Germanium
Phone: (+33|0) 6 80 89 08 23 80 avenue des Buttes de Coesmes
http://www.kerlabs.com/ 35700 Rennes
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-01-16 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-01-16 5:55 Oleg Nesterov
2009-01-16 10:35 ` Louis Rilling [this message]
2009-01-16 20:45 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-01-16 21:48 ` Louis Rilling
2009-01-16 22:21 ` Andrew Morton
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