From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
akpm <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH mainline] menu: fix embedded menu snafu
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 14:14:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090302141406.13d5ef1f.randy.dunlap@oracle.com> (raw)
From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
The COMPAT_BRK kconfig symbol does not depend on EMBEDDED,
but it is in the midst of the EMBEDDED menu symbols, so it mucks
up the EMBEDDED menu. Fix by moving it to just after all of
the EMBEDDED menu symbols. Also, surround all of the
EMBEDDED symbols with "if EMBEDDED"/"endif" so that this
EMBEDDED block is clearer.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- linux-2.6.29-rc6-git5.orig/init/Kconfig
+++ linux-2.6.29-rc6-git5/init/Kconfig
@@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ menuconfig EMBEDDED
environments which can tolerate a "non-standard" kernel.
Only use this if you really know what you are doing.
+if EMBEDDED
+
config UID16
bool "Enable 16-bit UID system calls" if EMBEDDED
depends on ARM || BLACKFIN || CRIS || FRV || H8300 || X86_32 || M68K || (S390 && !64BIT) || SUPERH || SPARC32 || (SPARC64 && COMPAT) || UML || (X86_64 && IA32_EMULATION)
@@ -780,18 +782,6 @@ config PCSPKR_PLATFORM
This option allows to disable the internal PC-Speaker
support, saving some memory.
-config COMPAT_BRK
- bool "Disable heap randomization"
- default y
- help
- Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
- also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
- This option changes the bootup default to heap randomization
- disabled, and can be overriden runtime by setting
- /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 2.
-
- On non-ancient distros (post-2000 ones) N is usually a safe choice.
-
config BASE_FULL
default y
bool "Enable full-sized data structures for core" if EMBEDDED
@@ -897,6 +887,20 @@ config SLUB_DEBUG
SLUB sysfs support. /sys/slab will not exist and there will be
no support for cache validation etc.
+endif # EMBEDDED
+
+config COMPAT_BRK
+ bool "Disable heap randomization"
+ default y
+ help
+ Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
+ also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
+ This option changes the bootup default to heap randomization
+ disabled, and can be overriden runtime by setting
+ /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 2.
+
+ On non-ancient distros (post-2000 ones) N is usually a safe choice.
+
choice
prompt "Choose SLAB allocator"
default SLUB
next reply other threads:[~2009-03-02 22:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-02 22:14 Randy Dunlap [this message]
2009-03-03 0:16 ` Andrew Morton
2009-03-03 0:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-03-03 0:30 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-03-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Randy Dunlap
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20090302141406.13d5ef1f.randy.dunlap@oracle.com \
--to=randy.dunlap@oracle.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
Powered by JetHome