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From: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com, Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@gmail.com>,
	Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>, Timo Sirainen <tss@iki.fi>,
	WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] Added PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA option for prctl()
Date: Tue,  8 Dec 2009 14:56:40 +0900 (JST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091208144004.B5AB.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091208053851.GA12383@elte.hu>

> 
> * KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> wrote:
> 
> > > The feature looks useful, but the choice of a prctl as an API is strange 
> > > - it limits us to the current task only - while the ability to set 
> > > arguments for another task looks a more generic (and potentially more 
> > > useful) solution.
> > 
> > No. It's impossible.
> > /proc/{pid}/cmdline read user process's memory. iow, this prctl() don't
> > receive string, it receive virtual address itself. [...]
> 
> it's not 'impossible' at all, you yourself mention ptrace:

Ah yes, 'impossible' was wrong word. but it doesn't works intentionally.

1. setproctitle() unaware application continue to see argv[0] directly.
  it makes some inconsistent behavior. 
2. proc title (i.e. string) injection need to map new page as process title area.
   implicit mapping increasing makes new trouble
   - mihgt cause to exceed max_map_count awhile after.
   - might cause leak proc title area (who know when it should be freed?)

I think reasonable way is 1. send signal (or use another inter process
communication way) to target process 2. target process change own proc title
themself.

Plus, I haven't seen the use-case of changin another task. iow I doubt
it's worth to change lots code.


> > [...] I don't want any task allow to change another task's memory 
> > except ptrace.
> 
> And i did not mean to allow 'any' task to be allowed to do this - 
> security checks apply, obviously.

Agreed. My 'any' didn't intent bypass security check ;-)




  reply	other threads:[~2009-12-08  5:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-12-08  3:15 KOSAKI Motohiro
2009-12-08  4:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-12-08  5:10   ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2009-12-08  5:38     ` Ingo Molnar
2009-12-08  5:56       ` KOSAKI Motohiro [this message]
2009-12-08  6:53         ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2009-12-08  6:58           ` Ingo Molnar
2009-12-08  6:28       ` Bryan Donlan
2009-12-08  6:57         ` Ingo Molnar
2009-12-08  7:19           ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2009-12-09  9:10             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-12-10  0:16               ` KOSAKI Motohiro

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