From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933047Ab0IXQfZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Sep 2010 12:35:25 -0400 Received: from kroah.org ([198.145.64.141]:37196 "EHLO coco.kroah.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933015Ab0IXQfR (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Sep 2010 12:35:17 -0400 X-Mailbox-Line: From gregkh@clark.site Fri Sep 24 09:33:46 2010 Message-Id: <20100924163346.796322398@clark.site> User-Agent: quilt/0.48-11.2 Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 09:31:55 -0700 From: Greg KH To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org Cc: stable-review@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Jeff Moyer Subject: [31/68] aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit In-Reply-To: <20100924163357.GA15741@kroah.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 2.6.32-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Jeff Moyer commit 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478 upstream. Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds checking on the passed-in iocb array:        if (unlikely(nr < 0))                return -EINVAL;        if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))                return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in. Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/aio.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/fs/aio.c +++ b/fs/aio.c @@ -1639,6 +1639,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t if (unlikely(nr < 0)) return -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp))) + nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp); + if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp))))) return -EFAULT;