From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: escape non-ASCII and control characters in printk()
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 14:12:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110701121202.GB28008@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110627083633.GA5846@albatros>
* Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 00:01 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > * Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> > > On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 21:46 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > > > No, because the problems such a mistake causes are not equivalent: it
> > > > would have been far more harmful to not print out the *very real*
> > > > product names written in some non-US language than to accidentally
> > > > include some control character you did not think of.
> > >
> > > ???
> > >
> > > Not "not print", but print in "crypted" form. The information
> > > is still not lost, you can obviously restore it to the original
> > > form, with some effort, but possible. Compare it with the harm
> > > of log spoofing - it is not "restorable".
> >
> > The harm of 'potential' log spoofing affecting exactly zero known
> > users right now,
>
> ???
>
> A potential thing affects all users that *can be* affected by
> actual log spoofing. This is what the word "potential" means.
Yes, but there's a world of a difference between alleged harm and
actual demonstrated harm.
That is a not so fine distinction that is often missed in security
circles! :-)
So what i asked for before and what i ask for here is to protect
against real, specific harm. If we just 'protect' against things that
look dangerous it's easy to over-protect and cause colletaral damage.
(like the UTF-8 details the v1 patch missed)
> Analogy: if some privilege escalation bug is found in some very
> core code then all users iteracting with an untrusted security
> domains (local users, network, etc.) being able to exploit it would
> be affected. It is silly to say that nobody is affected because you
> just don't know any such cases of this bug exploitation in the
> past.
That analogy does not hold. If a security hole is obvious at first
sight then we'll indeed fix it without waiting for someone to be
exploited.
But here the actual 'harm' is a lot less clear and what i'm trying to
steer you towards is to be more fact-based and less belief-based. The
only 'harm' that got demonstrated so far was collateral damage caused
by the v1 patch ...
Thanks,
Ingo
prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-01 12:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-23 15:21 Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 10:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 16:54 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 18:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 19:06 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 19:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 20:25 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 22:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-27 8:36 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-27 9:20 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-27 9:40 ` Alan Cox
2011-06-27 18:38 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-28 19:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01 12:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-07-01 12:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 14:20 ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 16:42 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-02 19:33 ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 20:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01 14:37 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 14:49 ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 8:10 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02 15:08 ` Greg KH
2011-07-03 10:01 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 11:42 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 12:23 ` Alan Cox
2011-07-03 17:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 21:10 ` Alan Cox
2011-07-03 21:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-05 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 12:12 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
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