mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: escape non-ASCII and control characters in printk()
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 14:12:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110701121202.GB28008@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110627083633.GA5846@albatros>


* Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 00:01 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > * Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> > > On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 21:46 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > > > No, because the problems such a mistake causes are not equivalent: it 
> > > > would have been far more harmful to not print out the *very real* 
> > > > product names written in some non-US language than to accidentally 
> > > > include some control character you did not think of.
> > > 
> > > ???
> > > 
> > > Not "not print", but print in "crypted" form.  The information 
> > > is still not lost, you can obviously restore it to the original 
> > > form, with some effort, but possible.  Compare it with the harm 
> > > of log spoofing - it is not "restorable".
> > 
> > The harm of 'potential' log spoofing affecting exactly zero known 
> > users right now,
> 
> ???
> 
> A potential thing affects all users that *can be* affected by 
> actual log spoofing.  This is what the word "potential" means.

Yes, but there's a world of a difference between alleged harm and 
actual demonstrated harm.

That is a not so fine distinction that is often missed in security 
circles! :-)

So what i asked for before and what i ask for here is to protect 
against real, specific harm. If we just 'protect' against things that 
look dangerous it's easy to over-protect and cause colletaral damage. 
(like the UTF-8 details the v1 patch missed)

> Analogy: if some privilege escalation bug is found in some very 
> core code then all users iteracting with an untrusted security 
> domains (local users, network, etc.) being able to exploit it would 
> be affected. It is silly to say that nobody is affected because you 
> just don't know any such cases of this bug exploitation in the 
> past.

That analogy does not hold. If a security hole is obvious at first 
sight then we'll indeed fix it without waiting for someone to be 
exploited.

But here the actual 'harm' is a lot less clear and what i'm trying to 
steer you towards is to be more fact-based and less belief-based. The 
only 'harm' that got demonstrated so far was collateral damage caused 
by the v1 patch ...

Thanks,

	Ingo

      parent reply	other threads:[~2011-07-01 12:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-23 15:21 Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 10:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 16:54   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 18:26     ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 19:06       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 19:46         ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-26 20:25           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-26 22:01             ` Ingo Molnar
2011-06-27  8:36               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-27  9:20                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-27  9:40                 ` Alan Cox
2011-06-27 18:38                   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-28 19:30                     ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01 12:00                       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-07-01 12:54                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 14:20                           ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 16:42                             ` Solar Designer
2011-07-02 19:33                               ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 20:34                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01 14:37                       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 14:49                         ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02  8:10                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02 15:08                             ` Greg KH
2011-07-03 10:01                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 11:42                             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 12:23                             ` Alan Cox
2011-07-03 17:42                             ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 21:10                               ` Alan Cox
2011-07-03 21:34                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-05 17:49                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 12:12                 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20110701121202.GB28008@elte.hu \
    --to=mingo@elte.hu \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@suse.de \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=namhyung@gmail.com \
    --cc=segoon@openwall.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®