From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932594Ab1GNXEi (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:04:38 -0400 Received: from earthlight.etchedpixels.co.uk ([81.2.110.250]:43708 "EHLO www.etchedpixels.co.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932437Ab1GNXEh (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:04:37 -0400 Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 00:00:37 +0100 From: Alan Cox To: Mike Waychison Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow disabling of sys_iopl, sys_ioperm Message-ID: <20110715000037.3fc1670a@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> In-Reply-To: References: <1310675693-9204-1-git-send-email-mikew@google.com> <1310675693-9204-2-git-send-email-mikew@google.com> <20110714234248.7ed43534@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.7.9 (GTK+ 2.22.0; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) Face: 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 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > a) you can do this with a security module > > I can? How? The whole LSM approach seems intractable to me. It would certainly need some trivial tweaking (to be specific we'd need to move from capable(x) to capable_syscall(x, syscall_code) for those interfaces that mattered, but that would probably be a good thing anyway from the point of view of beating the capability model into something more flexible and would help stuff like SELinux as well I think. We have an underlying separation of security from the other details - we really should keep it clean that way. Alan