From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932184Ab1JDMvj (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Oct 2011 08:51:39 -0400 Received: from mtagate3.uk.ibm.com ([194.196.100.163]:33366 "EHLO mtagate3.uk.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932079Ab1JDMvi (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Oct 2011 08:51:38 -0400 Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 14:51:34 +0200 From: Heiko Carstens To: Jiri Kosina Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust Message-ID: <20111004125134.GB2803@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> References: <4E8655CD.90107@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 01:19:27PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote: > On Fri, 30 Sep 2011, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > > > Since the kernel.org status announcement last week a number of you > > have contacted me about re-establishing credentials. In order to > > establish a proper PGP web of trust we need keys that are cross-signed > > by other developers. As such, we ask that you follow the following > > steps: > > > > 1. Make sure your systems are uncompromised. We will address specific > > recommended steps for that in a separate email. > > > > 2. Create a new PGP/GPG key, and also generate a key revocation > > certificate (but don't import it anywhere -- save it for the > > future) for your new key. In the near future we are considering > > setting up an escrow service for key revocation certificates. > > > > I recommend using a 4096-bit RSA key. Given how fast computers are > > these days, there is no reason to use a shorter key. DSA keys > > should be considered obsolete; substantial weaknesses have been > > found in DSA. > > > > $ gpg --gen-key > > $ gpg -u -o .revoke --gen-revoke > > > > 3. If you are reasonably certain that your old key has never been > > jeopardized, sign the new key with the old key. > > I have a question here. In case people are 'reasonably certain' that the > old key has never been jeoparadized, why are they required to create a new > key? > > (if the old key would have been compromised, the attacker could as well > generate a new key and sign it with the old key himself, so I fail to see > any benefit of this PGP excercise). > > It doesn't make too much sense to force people to live with two different > personalities in this "PGP web of trust" world just for the sake of > kernel.org, does it? Also same question here. And as far as I can tell nobody has given an answer yet.