Re: [PATCH 9/9] make net/core/scm.c uid comparisons user namespace aware

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>]

Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serge.hallyn@canonical.com):
> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> > "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> > 
> > > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> > >> Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> > >> 
> > >> > From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> > >> >
> > >> > Currently uids are compared without regard for the user namespace.
> > >> > Fix that to prevent tasks in a different user namespace from
> > >> > wrongly matching on SCM_CREDENTIALS.
> > >> >
> > >> > In the past, either your uids had to match, or you had to have
> > >> > CAP_SETXID.  In a namespaced world, you must either (both be in the
> > >> > same user namespace and have your uids match), or you must have
> > >> > CAP_SETXID targeted at the other user namespace.  The latter can
> > >> > happen for instance if uid 500 created a new user namespace and
> > >> > now interacts with uid 0 in it.
> > >> 
> > >> Serge this approach is wrong.
> > >
> > > Thanks for looking, Eric.
> > >
> > >> Because we pass the cred and the pid through the socket socket itself
> > >> is just a conduit and should be ignored in this context.
> > >
> > > Ok, that makes sense, but
> > >
> > >> The only interesting test should be are you allowed to impersonate other
> > >> users in your current userk namespace.
> > >
> > > Why in your current user namespace?  Shouldn't it be in the
> > > target user ns?  I understand it could be wrong to tie the
> > > user ns owning the socket to the target userns (though I still
> > > kind of like it), but just because I have CAP_SETUID in my
> > > own user_ns doesn't mean I should be able to pose as another
> > > uid in your user_ns.
> > 
> > First and foremost it is important that you be able if you have the
> > capability to impersonate other users in your current user namespace.
> > That is what the capability actually controls.
> > 
> > None of this allows you to impersonate any user in any other user
> > namespace.  The translation between users prevents that.
> > 
> > > (Now I also see that cred_to_ucred() translates to the current
> > > user_ns, so that should have been a hint to me before about
> > > your intent, but I'm not convinced I agree with your intent).
> > >
> > > And you do the same with the pid.  Why is that a valid assumption?
> > 
> > Yes.  Basically all the code is allow you to impersonate people you
> > would have been able to impersonate before.  If your target is in
> > another namespace you can not fool them.
> > 
> > With pids the logic should be a lot clearer.  Pretend to be a pid you can
> > see in your current pid namespace.  Lookup and convert to struct pid aka
> > the namespace agnostic object.  On output return the pid value that
> 
> No.  That conversion is happending before the user-specified pid is
> set.

Never mind, it all gets a little convoluted, but I see how it works,
and - when the time comes - how to do it right for userns.  :)  Sorry
about that.

thanks,
-serge