From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756103Ab2ALXaB (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2012 18:30:01 -0500 Received: from lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk ([81.2.110.251]:56690 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755278Ab2ALX3z (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2012 18:29:55 -0500 Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 23:27:35 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: Steven Rostedt Cc: Jamie Lokier , Oleg Nesterov , Will Drewry , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, segoon@openwall.com, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org, mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Message-ID: <20120112232735.5fa251e3@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <1326390981.7642.121.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> References: <1326302710-9427-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326302710-9427-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326383015.7642.77.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <20120112161418.GA22360@redhat.com> <1326386324.7642.96.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <20120112173048.GK7180@jl-vm1.vm.bytemark.co.uk> <1326390006.7642.114.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <20120112174433.GM7180@jl-vm1.vm.bytemark.co.uk> <1326390981.7642.121.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.7.10 (GTK+ 2.24.8; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) Face: iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAADAAAAAwBAMAAAClLOS0AAAAFVBMVEWysKsSBQMIAwIZCwj///8wIhxoRDXH9QHCAAABeUlEQVQ4jaXTvW7DIBAAYCQTzz2hdq+rdg494ZmBeE5KYHZjm/d/hJ6NfzBJpp5kRb5PHJwvMPMk2L9As5Y9AmYRBL+HAyJKeOU5aHRhsAAvORQ+UEgAvgddj/lwAXndw2laEDqA4x6KEBhjYRCg9tBFCOuJFxg2OKegbWjbsRTk8PPhKPD7HcRxB7cqhgBRp9Dcqs+B8v4CQvFdqeot3Kov6hBUn0AJitrzY+sgUuiA8i0r7+B3AfqKcN6t8M6HtqQ+AOoELCikgQSbgabKaJW3kn5lBs47JSGDhhLKDUh1UMipwwinMYPTBuIBjEclSaGZUk9hDlTb5sUTYN2SFFQuPe4Gox1X0FZOufjgBiV1Vls7b+GvK3SU4wfmcGo9rPPQzgIabfj4TYQo15k3bTHX9RIw/kniir5YbtJF4jkFG+dsDK1IgE413zAthU/vR2HVMmFUPIHTvF6jWCpFaGw/A3qWgnbxpSm9MSmY5b3pM1gvNc/gQfwBsGwF0VCtxZgAAAAASUVORK5CYII= Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Thus, execv will not be a "special" case here. Seccomp either allows it > or not. But also add a command to tell seccomp that this task will not > be allowed to do anything privileged. A setuid binary is not necessarily priviledged - indeed a root -> user transition via setuid is pretty much the reverse. It's a change of user context. Things like ptrace and file permissions basically mean you can't build a barrier between stuff running as the same uid to a great extent except with heavy restricting, but saying "you can't become someone else" is very useful. Alan