From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] c/r: prctl: Add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2012 16:40:29 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120305154029.GB12427@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120305144648.GA12341@moon>
On 03/05, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 05, 2012 at 03:26:55PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > > OK, I won't argue, probably this makes sense to make sure that
> > > admin can't get a heart attack looking at /proc/pid/exe.
> > >
> > > But the O_RDONLY check looks strange. We are not going to write
> > > to this file, we only set the name (and that is why I think it
> > > should be mm->exe_path). What is the point to check that the file
> > > was opened without FMODE_WRITE? Even if there were any security
> > > risk the apllication can open this file again with the different
> > > flags.
> >
>
> Hi Oleg!
>
> Replying to both your email -- I wanted to be as close to open_exec
> as possible.
I see. But open_exec() is different, it returns the file we are going
to read/mmap. PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE is different, I think O_RDONLY buys
nothing and looks confusing.
Anyway, as I said I won't argue.
> This prctl does cheat the kernel
Yep. Except, well, it cheats the user-space.
> but with this tests
> the cheating should be minimized (it's almost the same as open_exec
> does).
I don't reallt understand "minimized" ;) With this tests
proc/pid/exe can't look "obviously wrong", I agree. But that is all.
> > Seriously, I think we should cleanup this before c/r adds more
> > ugliness. I'll try to make the patch today.
>
> Cleanup what? If you mean this patch -- just point me what
> should I do.
I just sent the patch, "turn mm->exe_file into mm->exe_path"
> > And with all these checks I am no longer sure that fd is better
> > than filename ;)
>
> This security tests was a reason why I've used open_exec in
> first version of the patch
Yes, but me and Pavel forced you to use "int fd" ;)
> (and I still would prefer to
> have open_exec here instead of fd).
With the patch I sent "struct file *" is not needed at all.
I think prctl() can use user_path().
> As to allow-write-access -- it should be cleaned once process
> finished, no?
Exactly! And who will increment ->i_writecount? Nobody, that is
the problem.
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-03-05 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-29 15:16 Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-02-29 15:23 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2012-02-29 15:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-02-29 19:24 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-29 20:01 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-01 18:06 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-01 19:17 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-01 19:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-01 20:00 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-02 15:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-02 14:26 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-02 15:26 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-02 16:12 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-03 22:33 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-05 14:21 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-05 14:26 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-05 14:46 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-05 15:40 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2012-03-05 16:01 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-05 16:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-05 16:45 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
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