From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: rusty@rustcorp.com.au
Cc: kyle@mcmartin.ca, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/29] KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig [ver #4]
Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 00:39:23 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120510233923.4137.32120.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120510233901.4137.19023.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
security/Kconfig | 68 +----------------------------------------------
security/keys/Kconfig | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/keys/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index ccc61f8..e9c6ac7 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -4,73 +4,7 @@
menu "Security options"
-config KEYS
- bool "Enable access key retention support"
- help
- This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
- access keys in the kernel.
-
- It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
- associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
- support and the like can find them.
-
- Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
- a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
- to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
- process and thread.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config TRUSTED_KEYS
- tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
- depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_SHA1
- help
- This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
- keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
- generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
- if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
- see encrypted blobs.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
- tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
- depends on KEYS
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_AES
- select CRYPTO_CBC
- select CRYPTO_SHA256
- select CRYPTO_RNG
- help
- This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
- in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
- which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
- 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
- Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
- bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
- depends on KEYS
- help
- This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
- can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
- reading process.
-
- The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
- permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
- Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
- filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
-
- Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
- the resulting table.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+source security/keys/Kconfig
config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a90d6d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#
+# Key management configuration
+#
+
+config KEYS
+ bool "Enable access key retention support"
+ help
+ This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
+ access keys in the kernel.
+
+ It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
+ associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
+ support and the like can find them.
+
+ Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
+ a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
+ to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
+ process and thread.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+ tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ help
+ This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+ keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
+ if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
+ see encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+ tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+ in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
+ which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
+ 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
+ Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+ bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
+ can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
+ reading process.
+
+ The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
+ permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
+ Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
+ filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
+
+ Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
+ the resulting table.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-05-10 23:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-10 23:39 [PATCH 00/29] Crypto keys and module signing " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:39 ` [PATCH 01/29] MPILIB: Export some more symbols " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:39 ` David Howells [this message]
2012-05-10 23:39 ` [PATCH 03/29] KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:39 ` [PATCH 04/29] KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:39 ` [PATCH 05/29] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:40 ` [PATCH 06/29] KEYS: Add signature verification facility " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:40 ` [PATCH 07/29] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key subtype " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:40 ` [PATCH 08/29] KEYS: RSA signature verification algorithm " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:40 ` [PATCH 09/29] Fix signature verification for shorter signatures " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:40 ` [PATCH 10/29] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 11/29] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 12/29] PGPLIB: Signature " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 13/29] KEYS: PGP data " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 14/29] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 15/29] KEYS: PGP format signature parser " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:41 ` [PATCH 16/29] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:42 ` [PATCH 17/29] Provide macros for forming the name of an ELF note and its section " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:42 ` [PATCH 18/29] Guard check in module loader against integer overflow " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:42 ` [PATCH 19/29] MODSIGN: Add indications of module ELF types " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:42 ` [PATCH 20/29] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:42 ` [PATCH 21/29] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 22/29] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 23/29] MODSIGN: Module signature verification stub " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 24/29] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 25/29] MODSIGN: Check the ELF container " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 26/29] MODSIGN: Produce a filtered and canonicalised section list " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:43 ` [PATCH 27/29] MODSIGN: Create digest of module content and check signature " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:44 ` [PATCH 28/29] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing " David Howells
2012-05-10 23:44 ` [PATCH 29/29] MODSIGN: Suppress some redundant ELF checks " David Howells
2012-05-11 13:30 ` [PATCH 00/29] Crypto keys and module signing " Tetsuo Handa
2012-05-11 14:32 ` David Howells
2012-05-11 16:17 ` David Howells
2012-05-19 0:53 ` Rusty Russell
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