From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>,
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>,
Joe Korty <joe.korty@ccur.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add link restrictions
Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2012 10:14:23 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120630091422.GE14083@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1340658327-2932-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 02:05:26PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> +config PROTECTED_LINKS
> + bool "Evaluate vulnerable link conditions"
> + default y
Remember Linus' rants about 'default y' in general?
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PROTECTED_LINKS
> +int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly =
> + CONFIG_PROTECTED_SYMLINKS_SYSCTL;
> +int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly =
> + CONFIG_PROTECTED_HARDLINKS_SYSCTL;
> +
> +/**
> + * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
> + * @link: The path of the symlink
> + *
> + * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
> + * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is
> + * in a sticky world-writable directory. This is to protect privileged
> + * processes from failing races against path names that may change out
> + * from under them by way of other users creating malicious symlinks.
> + * It will permit symlinks to be followed only when outside a sticky
> + * world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower
> + * match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
> + */
> +static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
> +{
> + int error = 0;
> + const struct inode *parent;
> + const struct inode *inode;
> + const struct cred *cred;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> +
> + if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
> + return 0;
Um. What this says to me is "this function should be outside of ifdef, with
#else of that ifdef defining sysctl_protected_symlinks to 0".
> + /* Check parent directory mode and owner. */
I suspect that we ought to simply pass that parent directory as argument - caller
*does* have a reference to it, so we don't need to mess with ->d_lock, etc.
> + mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
umode_t, please.
> +static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
> +{
> + const struct cred *cred;
> + struct inode *inode;
> +
> + if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
> + return 0;
Ditto about taking it outside of ifdef.
> + err = may_follow_link(&link);
> + if (unlikely(err))
> + break;
No. This is definitely wrong - you are leaking dentries and vfsmount here.
> + error = may_follow_link(&link);
> + if (unlikely(error))
> + break;
Ditto.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-06-30 9:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-06-25 21:05 [PATCH v2012.4 0/2] " Kees Cook
2012-06-25 21:05 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kees Cook
2012-06-30 9:14 ` Al Viro [this message]
2012-07-02 0:43 ` Kees Cook
2012-07-02 1:26 ` Kees Cook
2012-06-25 21:05 ` [PATCH 2/2] fs: add link restriction audit reporting Kees Cook
2012-07-02 20:17 [PATCH v2012.5 0/2] fs: add link restrictions Kees Cook
2012-07-02 20:17 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kees Cook
2012-07-26 0:29 [RESEND][PATCH v2012.5 0/2] " Kees Cook
2012-07-26 0:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kees Cook
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