From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932680Ab2IDVfS (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:35:18 -0400 Received: from lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk ([81.2.110.251]:43736 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757858Ab2IDVfP (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:35:15 -0400 Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 22:39:57 +0100 From: Alan Cox To: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Cc: Matthew Garrett , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment Message-ID: <20120904223957.50f6a3b9@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <87r4qhwkx9.fsf@xmission.com> References: <1346774117-2277-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <1346774117-2277-8-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <87txvdzgur.fsf@xmission.com> <20120904202205.GA28903@srcf.ucam.org> <87r4qhwkx9.fsf@xmission.com> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.8.0 (GTK+ 2.24.8; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) Face: 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 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > Well, given that approximately everyone will be booting under EFI within > > 18 months, treating it as a niche case seems a little short sighted. Actually the majority of Linux devices are not PCs 8) > > secondly, there are already several non-EFI platforms that want to enact > > a policy preventing root from being able to arbitrarily replace the > > kernel. Given that people are doing this in the wild, it makes sense to > > move towards offering that policy in the mainline kernel. > > Either this code makes sense without an appeal to EFI or this code makes > no sense. Yes - and the capability is I think the right starting point (although you'll never make any OS locked down this way even if you are not in fact violating the GPLv2 license by doing so, which I suspect will be the case for some implementations) > So please rework this to come from an angle that makes sense all by > itself. I think it needs to be defined in terms of what the capability is supposed to guarantee. I have a feeling Matthew has a pretty clear idea about that in his head so can nail it fairly precisely ? Alan