From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759517Ab3BZE7W (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Feb 2013 23:59:22 -0500 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([93.93.128.6]:58268 "EHLO cavan.codon.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754288Ab3BZE7V (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Feb 2013 23:59:21 -0500 Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 04:59:18 +0000 From: Matthew Garrett To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Greg KH , David Howells , Florian Weimer , Josh Boyer , Peter Jones , Vivek Goyal , Kees Cook , keyrings@linux-nfs.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries Message-ID: <20130226045917.GB31181@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20130226023332.GA29282@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226030249.GB23834@kroah.com> <20130226031338.GA29784@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226033156.GA24999@kroah.com> <20130226033803.GA30285@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226035416.GA1128@kroah.com> <20130226040456.GA30717@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226041324.GA7241@kroah.com> <20130226042338.GA30944@srcf.ucam.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mjg59@cavan.codon.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cavan.codon.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 08:43:59PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > If the user has explicitly enrolled a hash then they're stepping outside > > the trust model. > > This is the kind of totally bogus crap that no sane person should ever > spout. Stop it. > > If the user has explicitly enrolled a hash, then that should be the > *primary* trust model, dammit. That should be very much what you > should care about first and foremost, and that should be your goal in > life. That's when the user says "I'm in control of my own machine, and > I want to trust *this*". The user has stepped outside the original trust model ("I trust anything signed by Microsoft and only things signed by Microsoft") and into a new one ("I trust things that I say I trust"). That's a great thing for a user to do, but it also means that once the user's done it we don't need to give a fuck about what Microsoft think. They're irrelevant once the user's made that choice. > It's not about "stepping outside of the trust model". Quite the > reverse. It's about actually being *part* of the trust model, and > taking control of your own machine. It's the *good* scenario. It's > what you should encourage users to do. I wholeheartedly agree. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org