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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 08:50:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130825065039.GB9299@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825052317.GZ27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 06:23:17AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 11:24:32PM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> 
> > I doubt it. It seems to me that most such entries are implemented
> > for completeness while most valid uses only concern /proc/self/fd.
> > Maybe if we had an option so that only /proc/self/fd would actually
> > allow to access the fds while all /proc/pid/fd would only show what
> > they map to, it would be a good step forward.
> 
> How?  The fundamental problem is not visibility of that stuff, it's
> new opened file for the same object (Linux behaviour) vs. new descriptor
> refering to the same opened file (*BSD and friends).  We can't get
> anon_... sanely reopened in the former semantics and they are very
> visibly different for regular files, so switching to *BSD one is not
> feasible - too high odds of userland breakage.  The difference in
> semantics, of course, is that on Linux opening /dev/stdin gives you
> a descriptor with independent current IO position; on *BSD you get
> a descriptor sharing the current IO position with stdin.  IOW, it's
> independent open() of the same file vs. dup().
> 
> We are really stuck with the current semantics here - switching to
> *BSD one would not only mean serious surgery on descriptor handling
> (it's one of the wartier areas in *BSD VFS, in large part because
> of magic-open-really-a-dup kludges they have to do), it would change
> a long-standing userland API that had been there for nearly 20 years
> _and_ one that tends to be used in corner cases of hell knows how many
> scripts.

Thanks for explaining Al, that really helps me understand. However
there's still a difference between /proc/pid called from the process
itself (=/proc/self) and called from other processes that seems to
suit the situation :

  willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /tmp/bash 
  -r-x--x--x 1 root users 916852 2013-08-25 08:19 /tmp/bash*
  willy@eeepc:~$ exec /tmp/bash -i
  willy@eeepc:~$ echo $$
  22678
  willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /proc/22678/fd
  ls: cannot open directory /proc/22678/fd: Permission denied
  willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /proc/22678/exe 
  ls: cannot read symbolic link /proc/22678/exe: Permission denied
  willy@eeepc:~$ cat /proc/22678/fd/0 
  cat: /proc/22678/fd/0: Permission denied

but :
  willy@eeepc:~$ read < /proc/22678/fd/0 
  azerazerazer
  willy@eeepc:~$ echo $REPLY
  azerazerazer

strace clearly shows that the process was allowed to inspect itself
and the other ones were not :

  willy@eeepc:~$ strace -p 22678
  open("/proc/22678/fd/0", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = 3

  willy@eeepc:~$ strace cat /proc/22678/fd/0 
  open("/proc/22678/fd/0", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)

It looks like this difference was introduced by this patch (which also fixes
this issue we've been having for a very long time on 2.4 and early 2.6) :

    8948e11 Allow access to /proc/$PID/fd after setuid()

Thus I'm wondering if something like this could help, the idea would be
that a with the appropriate mount option, a task could only look at its
own descriptors unless it's running with privileges :

    static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
                                  struct nameidata *nd)
    {
       if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
             return 0;
       if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
             return 0;
       if (proc_mounted_with_strict_option)
             return -EACCES;
       return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
    }

Thus it would not change the default behaviour except for people who would
mount /proc with a special option.

Thanks,
Willy


  reply	other threads:[~2013-08-25  6:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
     [not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 18:53   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23       ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15           ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23  1:07                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  3:37                       ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  7:26                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 14:23                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37                               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16                                   ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28  6:16                                         ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59                                             ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 23:08                                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29             ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24               ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25  5:23                 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  6:50                   ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2013-08-25 18:51                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54                               ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39                                     ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40                                       ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49                                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28                                               ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]                                     ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45                                       ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32                   ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58                     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45                 ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]               ` <20130825051044.GY27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
     [not found]                 ` <20130825155348.GB25922@redhat.com>
     [not found]                   ` <CALCETrXrtP2C+g=QeNWK4EMctmonW91kWoO1xmy7rDmEj__1Dw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                     ` <20130825174936.GA30957@redhat.com>
2013-08-25 17:55                       ` [PATCH 0/1] anon_inodefs: forbid open via /proc Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 17:55                         ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39       ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau

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