From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 08:50:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130825065039.GB9299@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825052317.GZ27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 06:23:17AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 11:24:32PM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
>
> > I doubt it. It seems to me that most such entries are implemented
> > for completeness while most valid uses only concern /proc/self/fd.
> > Maybe if we had an option so that only /proc/self/fd would actually
> > allow to access the fds while all /proc/pid/fd would only show what
> > they map to, it would be a good step forward.
>
> How? The fundamental problem is not visibility of that stuff, it's
> new opened file for the same object (Linux behaviour) vs. new descriptor
> refering to the same opened file (*BSD and friends). We can't get
> anon_... sanely reopened in the former semantics and they are very
> visibly different for regular files, so switching to *BSD one is not
> feasible - too high odds of userland breakage. The difference in
> semantics, of course, is that on Linux opening /dev/stdin gives you
> a descriptor with independent current IO position; on *BSD you get
> a descriptor sharing the current IO position with stdin. IOW, it's
> independent open() of the same file vs. dup().
>
> We are really stuck with the current semantics here - switching to
> *BSD one would not only mean serious surgery on descriptor handling
> (it's one of the wartier areas in *BSD VFS, in large part because
> of magic-open-really-a-dup kludges they have to do), it would change
> a long-standing userland API that had been there for nearly 20 years
> _and_ one that tends to be used in corner cases of hell knows how many
> scripts.
Thanks for explaining Al, that really helps me understand. However
there's still a difference between /proc/pid called from the process
itself (=/proc/self) and called from other processes that seems to
suit the situation :
willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /tmp/bash
-r-x--x--x 1 root users 916852 2013-08-25 08:19 /tmp/bash*
willy@eeepc:~$ exec /tmp/bash -i
willy@eeepc:~$ echo $$
22678
willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /proc/22678/fd
ls: cannot open directory /proc/22678/fd: Permission denied
willy@eeepc:~$ ls -la /proc/22678/exe
ls: cannot read symbolic link /proc/22678/exe: Permission denied
willy@eeepc:~$ cat /proc/22678/fd/0
cat: /proc/22678/fd/0: Permission denied
but :
willy@eeepc:~$ read < /proc/22678/fd/0
azerazerazer
willy@eeepc:~$ echo $REPLY
azerazerazer
strace clearly shows that the process was allowed to inspect itself
and the other ones were not :
willy@eeepc:~$ strace -p 22678
open("/proc/22678/fd/0", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = 3
willy@eeepc:~$ strace cat /proc/22678/fd/0
open("/proc/22678/fd/0", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
It looks like this difference was introduced by this patch (which also fixes
this issue we've been having for a very long time on 2.4 and early 2.6) :
8948e11 Allow access to /proc/$PID/fd after setuid()
Thus I'm wondering if something like this could help, the idea would be
that a with the appropriate mount option, a task could only look at its
own descriptors unless it's running with privileges :
static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
return 0;
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (proc_mounted_with_strict_option)
return -EACCES;
return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
}
Thus it would not change the default behaviour except for people who would
mount /proc with a special option.
Thanks,
Willy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-25 6:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 18:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23 1:07 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 3:37 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 7:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 14:23 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16 ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 6:16 ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59 ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 23:08 ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29 ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 5:23 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 6:50 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2013-08-25 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54 ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39 ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45 ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32 ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <20130825051044.GY27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
[not found] ` <20130825155348.GB25922@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CALCETrXrtP2C+g=QeNWK4EMctmonW91kWoO1xmy7rDmEj__1Dw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20130825174936.GA30957@redhat.com>
2013-08-25 17:55 ` [PATCH 0/1] anon_inodefs: forbid open via /proc Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 17:55 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39 ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau
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