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From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, joern@logfs.org, macro@linux-mips.org,
	ralf@linux-mips.org, dave.taht@gmail.com, blogic@openwrt.org,
	andrewmcgr@gmail.com, smueller@chronox.de, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	tg@mirbsd.de, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 03/12] random: Allow fractional bits to be tracked
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 00:01:48 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130923040148.GG7321@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1379882338-7209-4-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu>

I've added the following changes to this patch since upon testing,
there were some uses of r->entropy_count that were not properly
converted from using fractional bits to bits.

					- Ted

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1547338..8654b7e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
  * entropy_count, trickle_thresh
  */
 #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
 
 /*
  * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
@@ -618,7 +619,8 @@ retry:
 			r->initialized = 1;
 	}
 
-	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count,
+	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
+				  entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
 				  r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
 
 	/* should we wake readers? */
@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 
 	preempt_disable();
 	/* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
+	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) > trickle_thresh &&
 	    ((__this_cpu_inc_return(trickle_count) - 1) & 0xfff))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -999,7 +1001,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
 			r->last_data_init = true;
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 			trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
-					      r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
+					      ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
 			xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE);
 			extract_buf(r, tmp);
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
@@ -1008,7 +1010,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 	}
 
-	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
+	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
 	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
 	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
 
@@ -1041,7 +1043,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
 	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 
-	trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
+	trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
 	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
 	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
 
@@ -1213,8 +1215,8 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 			DEBUG_ENT("sleeping?\n");
 
 			wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
-				input_pool.entropy_count >=
-						 random_read_wakeup_thresh);
+				ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
+				random_read_wakeup_thresh);
 
 			DEBUG_ENT("awake\n");
 
@@ -1250,9 +1252,9 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
 	poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
 	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
 	mask = 0;
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
+	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
 		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
+	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
 		mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 	return mask;
 }
@@ -1303,7 +1305,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
 		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
-		ent_count = input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+		ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
 		if (put_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;

  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-23  4:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-22 20:38 [PATCH, RFC 00/12] random driver changes Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/12] random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/12] random: Statically compute poolbitshift, poolbytes, poolbits Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/12] random: Allow fractional bits to be tracked Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:01   ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2013-09-23  4:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/12] random: Account for entropy loss due to overwrites Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/12] random: fix the tracepoint for get_random_bytes(_arch) Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/12] random: optimize spinlock use in add_device_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/12] random: allow architectures to optionally define random_get_entropy() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23 10:38   ` Stephan Mueller
2013-09-23 11:05     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/12] random: mix in architectural randomness earlier in extract_buf() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:11   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-23  4:33     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/12] random: optimize the entropy_store structure Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/12] random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 21:21   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 21:40     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 22:45       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 23:23         ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  0:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/12] random: speed up the fast_mix function by a factor of four Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/12] random: adjust the generator polynomials in the mixing function slightly Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-25 10:51   ` Jörg-Volker Peetz

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