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From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com>,
	Peng Tao <tao.peng@emc.com>,
	devel@driverdev.osuosl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Nikita Danilov <nikita@clusterfs.com>
Subject: Re: lustre: why does cfs_get_random_bytes() exist?
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 10:26:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131003172621.GA14775@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131003163908.GD31721@thunk.org>

On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 12:39:08PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I've been auditing uses of get_random_bytes() since there are places
> where get_random_bytes() is getting used where something weaker, such
> as prandom_u32() is quite sufficient.  Basically, if kernel code just
> needs a random number which does not have any cryptographic
> requirements (such as in ext[234]. which gets the new block group used
> for inode allocations using get_random_bytes), then prandom_u32()
> should be used instead of get_random_bytes() to save CPU overhead and
> to reduce the drain on the /dev/urandom's entropy pool.
> 
> Typically, the reason for this is either for historical reasons, since
> prandom_u32() hadn't existed when the code was written, or because
> historical code was cut and pasted into newer code.
> 
> When I came across staging/lustre/lustre/libcfs/prng.c, I saw
> something which is **really** weird.  It defines a cfs_rand() which is
> functionally identical to prandom_u32().  More puzzlingly, it also
> defines cfs_get_random_bytes() which calls get_random_bytes() and then
> xor's the result with cfs_rand().  That last step has no cryptographic
> effect, so I'm really wondering who thought this as a good idea and/or
> necessary.
> 
> What I think should happen is that staging/lustre/lustre/libcfs/prng.c
> should be removed, and calls to cfs_rand() should get replaced
> prandom_u32(), and cfs_get_random_bytes() should get replaced with
> get_random_bytes().
> 
> Does this sound reasonable?

Sounds reasonable to me, care to send a patch to do so?

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2013-10-03 17:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-03 16:39 Theodore Ts'o
2013-10-03 17:26 ` Greg KH [this message]
2013-10-03 19:34   ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-10-03 23:06     ` Dilger, Andreas
2013-10-03 23:45       ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-10-05  6:10         ` Dilger, Andreas
2013-10-05 14:21           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-10-05 15:51             ` Christoph Hellwig

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