From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759728Ab3LFWAm (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Dec 2013 17:00:42 -0500 Received: from static.92.5.9.176.clients.your-server.de ([176.9.5.92]:54470 "EHLO hallynmail2" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758453Ab3LFWAi (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Dec 2013 17:00:38 -0500 Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 22:00:34 +0000 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Gao feng Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com, eparis@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, sgrubb@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/20] audit: allow GET, SET, USER MSG operations in audit namespace Message-ID: <20131206220033.GB22445@mail.hallyn.com> References: <1382599925-25143-1-git-send-email-gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> <1382599925-25143-17-git-send-email-gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1382599925-25143-17-git-send-email-gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Gao feng (gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com): > 1, remove the permission check of pid namespace. it's no reason > to deny un-init pid namespace to operate audit subsystem. > > 2, only allow init user namespace and init audit namespace to > operate list/add/del rule, tty set, trim, make equiv operations. > > 3, allow audit namespace to get/set audit configuration, send > userspace audit message. > > Signed-off-by: Gao feng > --- > kernel/audit.c | 13 ++++++------- > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 095f54d..c4d4291 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -573,11 +573,7 @@ out: > static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) > { > int err = 0; > - > - /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */ > - if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) || > - (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns)) > - return -EPERM; > + struct audit_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->audit_ns; > > switch (msg_type) { > case AUDIT_LIST: > @@ -586,6 +582,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > case AUDIT_GET: > case AUDIT_SET: > + break; So, these AUDIT_SET and AUDIT_GET go from requiring CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to not needing any privs at all? > case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: > case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: > case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: > @@ -594,13 +591,15 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) > case AUDIT_TTY_SET: > case AUDIT_TRIM: > case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: > - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > + if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) || > + (ns != &init_audit_ns) || > + !capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > err = -EPERM; > break; > case AUDIT_USER: > case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: > case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: > - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) > + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) > err = -EPERM; > break; > default: /* bad msg */ > -- > 1.8.3.1 > > _______________________________________________ > Containers mailing list > Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers