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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>,
	Stepan Moskovchenko <stepanm@codeaurora.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] vsprintf: BUG on %n
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2014 15:03:26 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140127230326.GA877@www.outflux.net> (raw)

Now that there has been a full release of the kernel, and all users
of %n have been dropped, switch to %n use triggering a BUG. Ignoring
arguments could be used to assist in information leaks if an arbitrary
format string was under the control of an attacker.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 lib/vsprintf.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 185b6d300ebc..a27fd7f61325 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1735,15 +1735,12 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 		case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS: {
 			/*
 			 * Since %n poses a greater security risk than
-			 * utility, ignore %n and skip its argument.
+			 * utility, it should not be implemented. Instead,
+			 * BUG when encountering %n, since there are no
+			 * legitimate users and skipping arguments could
+			 * assist information leak attacks.
 			 */
-			void *skip_arg;
-
-			WARN_ONCE(1, "Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n",
-					old_fmt);
-
-			skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *);
-			break;
+			BUG();
 		}
 
 		default:
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

             reply	other threads:[~2014-01-27 23:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-01-27 23:03 Kees Cook [this message]
2014-01-27 23:11 ` Ryan Mallon
2014-01-27 23:56   ` Kees Cook
2014-01-28  0:11     ` Ryan Mallon
2014-01-28  0:19       ` Kees Cook
2014-01-27 23:12 ` Joe Perches
2014-01-27 23:17   ` Andrew Morton

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