From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jim Lieb <jlieb@panasas.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
bfields@redhat.com
Subject: Re: Thoughts on credential switching
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 06:02:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140327060225.4f4caa5a@ipyr.poochiereds.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53341D8E.80105@redhat.com>
On Thu, 27 Mar 2014 13:46:06 +0100
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 03/27/2014 01:23 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > I propose the following set of new syscalls:
> >
> > int credfd_create(unsigned int flags): returns a new credfd that
> > corresponds to current's creds.
> >
> > int credfd_activate(int fd, unsigned int flags): Change current's
> > creds to match the creds stored in fd. To be clear, this changes
> > both the "subjective" and "objective" (aka real_cred and cred)
> > because there aren't any real semantics for what happens when
> > userspace code runs with real_cred != cred.
>
> This interface does not address the long-term lack of POSIX
> compliance in setuid and friends, which are required to be
> process-global and not thread-specific (as they are on the kernel
> side).
>
> glibc works around this by reserving a signal and running set*id on
> every thread in a special signal handler. This is just crass, and it
> is likely impossible to restore the original process state in case of
> partial failure. We really need kernel support to perform the
> process-wide switch in an all-or-nothing manner.
>
I disagree. We're treading new ground here with this syscall. It's
not defined by POSIX so we're under no obligation to follow its silly
directives in this regard. Per-process cred switching doesn't really
make much sense in this day and age, IMO. Wasn't part of the spec was
written before threading existed
The per-process credential switching is pretty universally a pain in
the ass for anyone who wants to write something like a threaded file
server. Jeremy Allison had to jump through some rather major hoops to
work around it for Samba [1]. I think we want to strive to make this a
per-task credential switch and ignore that part of the POSIX spec.
That said, I think we will need to understand and document what we
expect to occur if someone does this new switch_creds(fd) call and then
subsequently calls something like setuid(), if only to ensure that we
don't get blindsided by it.
[1]: http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-help/2012-07/msg00004.html
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-27 13:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-27 0:23 Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 0:42 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-03-27 1:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 15:41 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-27 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 2:48 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-27 3:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 3:25 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-27 14:08 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-29 6:43 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-03-30 13:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-30 18:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-31 11:51 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-31 18:06 ` Trond Myklebust
2014-03-31 18:12 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-31 19:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-31 20:14 ` Trond Myklebust
2014-03-31 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 12:46 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-27 13:02 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2014-03-27 13:06 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-27 13:33 ` Boaz Harrosh
2014-04-22 11:37 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:14 ` Boaz Harrosh
2014-04-22 16:35 ` Jim Lieb
2014-03-27 14:01 ` Jeff Layton
2014-03-27 18:26 ` Jeremy Allison
2014-03-27 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 18:56 ` Jeremy Allison
2014-03-27 19:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 19:30 ` Jim Lieb
2014-03-27 19:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-27 20:47 ` Jim Lieb
2014-03-27 21:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-31 10:44 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-31 16:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-01 20:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-31 19:05 ` Jeremy Allison
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