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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>,
	John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>,
	Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>,
	liguang <lig.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] seccomp: introduce writer locking
Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 10:49:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140523084914.GA30445@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1400799936-26499-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1405 bytes --]

On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 04:05:33PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Normally, task_struct.seccomp.filter is only ever read or modified by
> the task that owns it (current). This property aids in fast access
> during system call filtering as read access is lockless.
> 
> Updating the pointer from another task, however, opens up race
> conditions. To allow cross-task filter pointer updates, writes to the
> seccomp fields are now protected by a spinlock.  Read access remains
> lockless because pointer updates themselves are atomic.  However, writes
> (or cloning) often entail additional checking (like maximum instruction
> counts) which require locking to perform safely.
> 
> In the case of cloning threads, the child is invisible to the system
> until it enters the task list. To make sure a child can't be cloned
> from a thread and left in a prior state, seccomp duplication is moved
> under the tasklist_lock. Then parent and child are certain have the same
> seccomp state when they exit the lock.
> 

So I'm a complete noob on the whole seccomp thing, so maybe this is a
silly question, but.. what about object lifetimes?

Looking at put_seccomp_filter() it explicitly takes a tsk pointer,
suggesting one can call it on !current. And while it does a dec_and_test
on the object itself, run_filter() does nothing with refcounts, and
therefore can be touching dead memory.



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  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-05-23  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-05-22 23:05 [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-05-23  0:28   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2014-05-23  8:49   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2014-05-23 21:05     ` Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] seccomp: move no_new_privs into seccomp Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_FILTER Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] seccomp: add SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC and SECCOMP_FILTER_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-05-22 23:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-23 17:05     ` Kees Cook
2014-05-26 19:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 18:24         ` Kees Cook
2014-05-27 18:40           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 18:45             ` Kees Cook
2014-05-27 19:10               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 19:23                 ` Kees Cook
2014-05-27 19:27                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 19:55                     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-02 20:53                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-03  0:14                         ` Kees Cook
2014-06-03  0:29                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-03  1:09                             ` Kees Cook
2014-06-03  1:15                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-03 19:53                                 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-02 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-06-02 19:59   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-02 20:06     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-02 21:17       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-02 23:05         ` Kees Cook
2014-06-02 23:08           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-03 10:12             ` Michael Kerrisk
2014-06-03 23:47               ` Julien Tinnes

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