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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Russell King" <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Jonathan Austin" <jonathan.austin@arm.com>,
	"André Hentschel" <nerv@dawncrow.de>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	"Ricky Zhou" <rickyz@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH] arm: ptrace: fix syscall modification under PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140618202748.GA9022@www.outflux.net> (raw)

An x86 tracer wanting to change the syscall uses PTRACE_SETREGS
(stored to regs->orig_ax), and an ARM tracer uses PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
(stored to current_thread_info()->syscall). When this happens, the
syscall can change across the call to secure_computing(), since it may
block on tracer notification, and the tracer can then make changes
to the process, before we return from secure_computing(). This
means the code must respect the changed syscall after the
secure_computing() call in syscall_trace_enter(). The same is true
for tracehook_report_syscall_entry() which may also block and change
the syscall.

The x86 code handles this (it expects orig_ax to always be the
desired syscall). In the ARM case, this means we should not be touching
current_thread_info()->syscall after its initial assignment. All failures
should result in a -1 syscall, though.

Based on patch by Ricky Zhou.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c |   20 +++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0dd3b79b15c3..97bd95f6aa01 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -911,6 +911,7 @@ enum ptrace_syscall_dir {
 static int tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs,
 				    enum ptrace_syscall_dir dir)
 {
+	int ret = 0;
 	unsigned long ip;
 
 	/*
@@ -923,30 +924,35 @@ static int tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	if (dir == PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT)
 		tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
 	else if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-		current_thread_info()->syscall = -1;
+		ret = -1;
 
 	regs->ARM_ip = ip;
-	return current_thread_info()->syscall;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 {
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* set up syscall, which may be changed in secure_computing */
 	current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
 	if (secure_computing(scno) == -1)
 		return -1;
 
-	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		scno = tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER))
+		ret = -1;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
-		trace_sys_enter(regs, scno);
+		trace_sys_enter(regs, current_thread_info()->syscall);
 
-	audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_ARM, scno, regs->ARM_r0, regs->ARM_r1,
+	audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_ARM, current_thread_info()->syscall,
+			    regs->ARM_r0, regs->ARM_r1,
 			    regs->ARM_r2, regs->ARM_r3);
 
-	return scno;
+	return ret ?: current_thread_info()->syscall;
 }
 
 asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

             reply	other threads:[~2014-06-18 20:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-18 20:27 Kees Cook [this message]
2014-06-18 20:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-20 10:22 ` Will Deacon
2014-06-20 16:44   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-20 17:23     ` Will Deacon
2014-06-20 17:36       ` Kees Cook
2014-06-20 18:10         ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23  8:46           ` Will Deacon
2014-06-23 19:46             ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24  8:54               ` Will Deacon
2014-06-24  9:20                 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-03  7:43                 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-03 10:24                   ` Will Deacon
2014-07-03 15:39                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-03 16:11                       ` Will Deacon
2014-07-03 16:13                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-03 16:32                           ` Will Deacon
2014-07-04 23:05                             ` Andy Lutomirski

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