Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

[Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>]

On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote:
> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
> for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
> signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
> subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
> mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
> 
> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
> 
> CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
> CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
> CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>

Patch applied.
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt