From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH16/17] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 data
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 16:17:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140709151707.23074.53136.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140709151525.23074.32315.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the
PKCS#7 signed content.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 197 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index b975918..029a365 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -185,6 +185,192 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
return -ELIBBAD;
}
+/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+ const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+ return -1;
+
+ rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx,
+ struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+ * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp,
+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!canon)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+ * insertion sort.
+ */
+ canon[0] = 0;
+ for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+ if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+ &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+ memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+ (loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ canon[i] = loop;
+ }
+
+ hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ i = canon[loop];
+ if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+ continue;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+ ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(canon);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+ }
+ kfree(canon);
+
+ if (pelen > hashed_bytes) {
+ tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ pebuf + hashed_bytes,
+ pelen - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+ pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error_no_desc;
+ }
+ pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+ /* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+ * PKCS#7 certificate.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+ }
+
+error:
+ kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
@@ -252,6 +438,17 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n",
ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+ /* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+ * contents.
+ */
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
error:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-09 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-09 15:15 [PATCH 00/17] KEYS: PKCS#7 and PE file signature checking for kexec David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH01/17] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7 David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH02/17] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH03/17] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315] David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH04/17] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message David Howells
2014-07-09 15:15 ` [PATCH05/17] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH06/17] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain David Howells
2014-07-10 17:06 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2014-07-10 20:37 ` David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH07/17] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keys David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH08/17] PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7 David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH09/17] KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistake David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH10/17] Provide PE binary definitions David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH11/17] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH12/17] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH13/17] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blob David Howells
2014-07-09 15:16 ` [PATCH14/17] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob David Howells
2014-07-09 15:17 ` [PATCH15/17] pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OID David Howells
2014-07-09 15:17 ` David Howells [this message]
2014-07-09 15:17 ` [PATCH17/17] pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain David Howells
2014-07-09 16:03 ` [PATCH 00/17] KEYS: PKCS#7 and PE file signature checking for kexec Borislav Petkov
2014-07-09 16:21 ` Vivek Goyal
2014-07-09 16:28 ` David Howells
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