From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@intel.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: Tainting the kernel on raw I/O access
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 16:56:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140904165606.640df107@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5407955C.3040501@intel.com>
On Wed, 03 Sep 2014 15:25:32 -0700
"H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@intel.com> wrote:
> On 09/03/2014 03:20 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> >
> > If you just want some "detector bits" for bug report filtering them its
> > quite a different need to fixing "secure" boot mode. Even in the detector
> > bits case there should be an overall plan and some defined properties
> > that provide the security and which you can show should always be true.
> >
>
> As far as I'm concerning this is just a set of "detector bits". My
> observation was simply that this is a *subset* of what "secure boot"
> will eventually need.
I think that observation is untrue. The only partially overap.
> (As far as I'm concerned, I'd be happy tainting the kernel for any
> operation that requires CAP_RAWIO, but maybe that is too extreme.)
You can't then for example format some types of disk in your data center.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-04 16:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-03 21:20 H. Peter Anvin
2014-09-03 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-09-03 22:20 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-09-03 22:25 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-09-04 15:56 ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2014-09-03 23:46 ` Andi Kleen
2014-09-04 14:10 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2014-09-04 16:43 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-09-04 5:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2014-09-04 16:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
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