From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>,
Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] sysctl: terminate strings also on \r
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 13:21:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141021202137.GA20114@www.outflux.net> (raw)
From: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net>
This partially mitigates a common strategy used by attackers for hiding
the full contents of strings in procfs from naive sysadmins who use cat,
more or sysctl to inspect the contents of strings in procfs.
References: http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2014/05/07/hacking-contest-hiding-stuff-from-the-terminal/
Signed-off-by: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 4aada6d9fe74..c34c9414caac 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static int _proc_do_string(char *data, int maxlen, int write,
while ((p - buffer) < *lenp && len < maxlen - 1) {
if (get_user(c, p++))
return -EFAULT;
- if (c == 0 || c == '\n')
+ if (c == 0 || c == '\n' || c == '\r')
break;
data[len++] = c;
}
--
1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
next reply other threads:[~2014-10-21 20:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-21 20:21 Kees Cook [this message]
2014-10-22 10:03 ` Aaron Tomlin
2014-10-22 13:39 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-10-22 22:49 ` David Rientjes
2014-10-22 23:26 ` Andrew Morton
2014-10-22 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2014-10-23 2:00 ` Andrew Morton
2014-10-23 16:39 ` Kees Cook
2014-10-23 18:23 ` Andrew Morton
2014-10-23 18:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-10-27 9:56 ` Pavel Machek
2014-10-27 10:11 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2014-10-27 12:01 ` Pavel Machek
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