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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 15:42:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141105154217.2555.578.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling.  The xattr copy up stub
discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e66314138b38..f3fe7dbbf741 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3142,6 +3142,19 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
+				       const char *name, void *value, size_t *size)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Discard */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -5868,6 +5881,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
 	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
+	.inode_copy_up =		selinux_inode_copy_up,
+	.inode_copy_up_xattr =		selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-11-05 15:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-11-05 15:42 [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:46   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 14:49   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 21:22   ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:10   ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:28     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2014-11-07 21:39   ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:05   ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:45     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` David Howells [this message]
2014-11-07 21:44   ` [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:08   ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:47     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 4/7] Security: Pass the union-layer file path into security_file_open() David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:35   ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 12:03   ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:13     ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:34     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15     ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27   ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25   ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30   ` David Howells
2015-06-15 12:57     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16  9:41     ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49     ` David Howells
2015-06-16 17:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 21:34       ` David Howells
2015-06-17 14:44         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 10:15         ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:48           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:26           ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32       ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:16         ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:43   ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 17:54     ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:39       ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-27 14:17     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21     ` David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 7/7] SELinux: Check against union and lower labels for file ops on lower files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 18:40   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 15:21   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 18:54     ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-09  1:31       ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-10 13:59         ` Daniel J Walsh

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