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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: [ 13/25] x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2014 18:42:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141206174148.982073196@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2a26e912d2438674771c36169c190830@local>

2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.

On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code.  The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.

This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.

This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441)
[wt: no CONFIG_TRACING on 2.6.32, Fixes CVE-2014-9090]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h |  1 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 11 +++++------
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c       |  1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c              | 14 +-------------
 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
index 6f1b733..775c92f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #endif
 #define THREAD_SIZE 	(PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_ORDER)
 
-#define STACKFAULT_STACK 0
 #define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 1
 #define NMI_STACK 0
 #define DEBUG_STACK 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 7639dbf..a9e9937 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -14,12 +14,11 @@
 #define IRQ_STACK_ORDER 2
 #define IRQ_STACK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << IRQ_STACK_ORDER)
 
-#define STACKFAULT_STACK 1
-#define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 2
-#define NMI_STACK 3
-#define DEBUG_STACK 4
-#define MCE_STACK 5
-#define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 5  /* hw limit: 7 */
+#define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 1
+#define NMI_STACK 2
+#define DEBUG_STACK 3
+#define MCE_STACK 4
+#define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 4  /* hw limit: 7 */
 
 #define PUD_PAGE_SIZE		(_AC(1, UL) << PUD_SHIFT)
 #define PUD_PAGE_MASK		(~(PUD_PAGE_SIZE-1))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index a071e6b..5dc0882 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ static char x86_stack_ids[][8] = {
 		[DEBUG_STACK - 1] = "#DB",
 		[NMI_STACK - 1] = "NMI",
 		[DOUBLEFAULT_STACK - 1] = "#DF",
-		[STACKFAULT_STACK - 1] = "#SS",
 		[MCE_STACK - 1] = "#MC",
 #if DEBUG_STKSZ > EXCEPTION_STKSZ
 		[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS ...
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
index 4313d48..8e2f14a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ END(xen_failsafe_callback)
 
 paranoidzeroentry_ist debug do_debug DEBUG_STACK
 paranoidzeroentry_ist int3 do_int3 DEBUG_STACK
-paranoiderrorentry stack_segment do_stack_segment
+errorentry stack_segment do_stack_segment
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 zeroentry xen_debug do_debug
 zeroentry xen_int3 do_int3
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 7e37dce..c4cc05a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -220,23 +220,11 @@ DO_ERROR_INFO(6, SIGILL, "invalid opcode", invalid_op, ILL_ILLOPN, regs->ip)
 DO_ERROR(9, SIGFPE, "coprocessor segment overrun", coprocessor_segment_overrun)
 DO_ERROR(10, SIGSEGV, "invalid TSS", invalid_TSS)
 DO_ERROR(11, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present)
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 DO_ERROR(12, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment)
-#endif
 DO_ERROR_INFO(17, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check, BUS_ADRALN, 0)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /* Runs on IST stack */
-dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
-{
-	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "stack segment", regs, error_code,
-			12, SIGBUS) == NOTIFY_STOP)
-		return;
-	preempt_conditional_sti(regs);
-	do_trap(12, SIGBUS, "stack segment", regs, error_code, NULL);
-	preempt_conditional_cli(regs);
-}
-
 dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
 	static const char str[] = "double fault";
@@ -927,7 +915,7 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
 	set_intr_gate(9, &coprocessor_segment_overrun);
 	set_intr_gate(10, &invalid_TSS);
 	set_intr_gate(11, &segment_not_present);
-	set_intr_gate_ist(12, &stack_segment, STACKFAULT_STACK);
+	set_intr_gate(12, &stack_segment);
 	set_intr_gate(13, &general_protection);
 	set_intr_gate(14, &page_fault);
 	set_intr_gate(15, &spurious_interrupt_bug);
-- 
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty




  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-12-06 17:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2a26e912d2438674771c36169c190830@local>
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 00/25] 2.6.32.65-longterm review Willy Tarreau
2014-12-08  0:58   ` Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 01/25] net: sendmsg: fix failed backport of "fix NULL pointer dereference" Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 02/25] x86, 64-bit: Move K8 B step iret fixup to fault entry asm Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 03/25] x86-64: Adjust frame type at paranoid_exit: Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 04/25] x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 05/25] x86-32, espfix: Remove filter for espfix32 due to race Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 06/25] x86-64, espfix: Dont leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 07/25] x86, espfix: Move espfix definitions into a separate header file Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 08/25] x86, espfix: Fix broken header guard Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 09/25] x86, espfix: Make espfix64 a Kconfig option, fix UML Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 10/25] x86, espfix: Make it possible to disable 16-bit support Willy Tarreau
2014-12-08  2:58   ` Ben Hutchings
2014-12-08  7:11     ` Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:41 ` [ 11/25] x86_64/entry/xen: Do not invoke espfix64 on Xen Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 12/25] x86/espfix/xen: Fix allocation of pages for paravirt page tables Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 14/25] x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 15/25] x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 16/25] net/l2tp: dont fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 17/25] ALSA: control: Dont access controls outside of protected regions Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 18/25] ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 19/25] USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 20/25] net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 21/25] net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 22/25] udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 23/25] net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 24/25] mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption Willy Tarreau
2014-12-06 17:42 ` [ 25/25] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl Willy Tarreau

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