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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: sds@tycho.nsa.gov, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 14:32:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150618133254.12722.33339.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150618133215.12722.70352.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling.  The xattr copy up stub
discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
+				       const char *name, void *value,
+				       size_t *size)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Discard */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
 	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
+	.inode_copy_up =		selinux_inode_copy_up,
+	.inode_copy_up_xattr =		selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-18 13:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-18 13:32 [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 1/8] overlay: Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 2/8] overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay David Howells
2015-07-20 12:42   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-07-21 13:28     ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 3/8] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 4/8] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` David Howells [this message]
2015-06-18 14:44   ` [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:34   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-06-18 16:51   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2015-06-18 14:54   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:04   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label David Howells
2015-06-18 14:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:13   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:20     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:32     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:47       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 8/8] SELinux: Check against union label for file operations David Howells
2015-06-19  7:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support Al Viro
2015-06-19  7:52   ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  7:59     ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:11       ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  8:29         ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:36           ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 14:04   ` David Howells

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