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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 21:18:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150803191854.GC24014@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVCC+eLKjGWWFcg2_nMN_8j2m0jp714YrEiJRj4Qy=zmg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 12:06:12PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
(...)
> > I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
> > we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
> > patch available.
> 
> Sounds good to me.

OK I'll send the other one instead once I unpack my PC.

> > Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
> > least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
> > to emulate IRET though.
> 
> You sure?  I'm reasonably confident that Athlon 64 and newer support
> SYSRET in legacy and long mode.  Of course, I think that SYSCALL is
> totally worthless in legacy mode (SYSCALL_MASK isn't available, so I
> suspect that the lack of sensible TF handling would be a
> show-stopper).

I meant loadall cannot be screwed since it was replaced.

> >> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
> >> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
> >> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
> >>
> >> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> >> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
> >
> > A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
> > so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
> > one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.
> >
> 
> How about a dedicated "NMI masked" flag in EFLAGS?  That would be
> straightforward and dead simple to handle.

Sounds like an oxymoron. But such a flag should be atomically manipulated
so that you don't re-arm queued NMIs before calling iret. With two flags,
a read-only one for "NMI masked" and a modifiable one "keep NMI masked",
you can provide an atomic behaviour where you have this latch executed
on iret :

     NMI_MASKED &= KEEP_NMI_MASKED;
     KEEP_NMI_MASKED = 0;

But anyway we're discussing in the void, this CPU doesn't exist so unless
intel/AMD designers want to improve their design (and start by talking
together to reach the exact same behavior), we'll never see anything like
this :-/

Willy


  reply	other threads:[~2015-08-03 19:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-03 18:23 [PATCH 0/2] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 18:23 ` [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 18:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-03 18:50     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 18:23 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 18:45   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-03 19:01     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 19:06       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-03 19:18         ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2015-08-04  3:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2015-08-04  6:00       ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-03 22:35   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-03 23:19     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-04  1:36       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time Willy Tarreau
2015-08-05  8:00   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-08-05  8:08     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-05  8:26       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-08-05  9:03         ` Willy Tarreau
2015-08-05  9:10           ` Ingo Molnar

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