Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: zero IDT limit on entry to SMM

["Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>]

2015-08-07 12:54+0200, Paolo Bonzini:
> The recent BlackHat 2015 presentation "The Memory Sinkhole"
> mentions that the IDT limit is zeroed on entry to SMM.

Slide 64 of
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Domas-The-Memory-Sinkhole-Unleashing-An-x86-Design-Flaw-Allowing-Universal-Privilege-Escalation.pdf

> This is not documented, and must have changed some time after 2010
> (see http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/IT_Defense_2010_final.pdf).
> KVM was not doing it, but the fix is easy.

This patch also clears the IDT base.  Fetching original IDT is better
done from SMM saved state (and an anti-exploit based on comparing those
two seems unlikely) so it should be fine,

Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---

That takes care of Attack 1.
KVM is likely not vulnerable to attack 2 and 3 because of an emergent
security feature.  (A simple modification of kvm-unit-tests show that
mapping APIC base on top of real code/data makes the APIC page hidden
and I expect SMM memslot to behave similarly.)