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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 11:34:42 -0600
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        peterhuewe@gmx.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
        akpm@linux-foundation.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
        Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>,
        David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0
Message-ID: <20151013173442.GB22160@obsidianresearch.com>
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On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 11:38:17AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing
> trusted keys.
> 
> This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for
> TPM 2.0:

We really need to stop using chip id's as a handle - the caller should
be using a pointer, it is just a horrible API, and the TPM_ANY_NUM
business is awful too.. TPM's are stateful devices!

Is it feasible to introduce new APIs with a saner scheme?

The api layering also seems really weird to me. At a minimum the
tpm_seal_trusted should be called within key_seal, but really, should
key_seal be migrated into the TPM core? I'm not sure it makes alot of
sense to have a tpm_seal_trusted which uses the high level key structs
when other tpm functions are all low level RPC wrappers...

Jason