From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, petkan@mip-labs.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 08/20] KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key [ver #2]
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 11:31:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160119113126.23238.35672.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160119113026.23238.4498.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.
For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 7 +++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 2 +-
include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 +++--
include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 2 +-
include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 9f2165b27d52..a79d30128821 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -331,7 +331,8 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]);
+ subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto],
+ prep->payload.data[asym_auth]);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
@@ -346,13 +347,15 @@ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ void *auth = key->payload.data[asym_auth];
key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+ key->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(data);
+ subtype->destroy(data, auth);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 6db4c01c6503..e537aaeafdbf 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -59,18 +59,34 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
/*
* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
*/
-void public_key_destroy(void *payload)
+void public_key_free(struct public_key *key,
+ struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
- struct public_key *key = payload;
int i;
if (key) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi); i++)
mpi_free(key->mpi[i]);
kfree(key);
+ key = NULL;
}
+
+ if (sig) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->mpi); i++)
+ mpi_free(sig->mpi[i]);
+ kfree(sig->digest);
+ kfree(sig);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
+ */
+static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+ public_key_free(payload0, payload3);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
/*
* Verify a signature using a public key.
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 021d39c0ba75..74152f1e99eb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct x509_parse_context {
void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
if (cert) {
- public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
+ public_key_free(cert->pub, NULL);
kfree(cert->issuer);
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index de50d026576d..a3f8f8268e23 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -72,8 +72,6 @@ struct public_key {
};
};
-extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
-
/*
* Public key cryptography signature data
*/
@@ -95,6 +93,9 @@ struct public_key_signature {
};
};
+extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key,
+ struct public_key_signature *sig);
+
struct key;
extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
index 4915d40d3c3c..2480469ce8fb 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype {
void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m);
/* Destroy a key of this subtype */
- void (*destroy)(void *payload);
+ void (*destroy)(void *payload_crypto, void *payload_auth);
/* Verify the signature on a key of this subtype (optional) */
int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key,
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
index 72c18c1f3308..d1e23dda4363 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
@@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric;
* follows:
*/
enum asymmetric_payload_bits {
- asym_crypto,
- asym_subtype,
- asym_key_ids,
+ asym_crypto, /* The data representing the key */
+ asym_subtype, /* Pointer to an asymmetric_key_subtype struct */
+ asym_key_ids, /* Pointer to an asymmetric_key_ids struct */
+ asym_auth /* The key's authorisation (signature, parent key ID) */
};
/*
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-19 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-19 11:30 [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key " David Howells
2016-01-20 18:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:30 ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 19:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-20 20:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:27 ` David Howells
2016-02-08 13:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 13:55 ` David Howells
2016-02-08 15:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 15:53 ` How to add additional blacklist entries? David Howells
2016-02-08 16:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 16:43 ` David Howells
2016-02-08 19:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-09 10:42 ` David Howells
2016-02-10 14:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 14:55 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring [ver #2] David Howells
2016-02-08 16:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:48 ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:29 ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:46 ` David Howells
2016-02-05 16:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-29 15:49 ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] X.509: Retain the key verification data " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it " David Howells
2016-02-08 12:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:56 ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-02-10 19:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:58 ` David Howells
2016-02-19 12:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] IMA: Replace the .ima_mok keyring with the secondary system keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " Petko Manolov
2016-01-20 18:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:47 ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:56 ` David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160119113126.23238.35672.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=petkan@mip-labs.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®