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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>,
	Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>,
	Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:09:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160119220904.3102.51075.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)

From: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>

This fixes CVE-2016-0728.

If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stddef.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial < 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.

Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
---

 security/keys/process_keys.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index a3f85d2a00bb..e6d50172872f 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
 		goto error2;
 	} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
+		key_put(keyring);
 		ret = 0;
 		goto error2;
 	}

             reply	other threads:[~2016-01-19 22:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-19 22:09 David Howells [this message]
2016-01-20  8:20 ` Greg KH
2016-01-20  9:36 ` David Howells

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