From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753184AbcHOPvh convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:51:37 -0400 Received: from mail01.sigterm.no ([193.150.121.27]:46637 "EHLO mail01.sigterm.no" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752713AbcHOPvg (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:51:36 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 335 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:51:35 EDT X-Mailer: smtp.postman.i2p - Official I2P Mailer From: <1471274895@i2pmail.org> To: Subject: Fake Linus Torvalds' Key Found in the Wild, No More Short-IDs. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Message-Id: <20160815153401.9EC2BADC2C@smtp.postman.i2p> Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 15:34:01 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org It was well-known that PGP is vulnerable to short-ID collisions, and many experiments were done to demonstrate that. [0] Nevertheless, real attacks started in June, some developers found their fake keys with same name, email, and even "same" fake signatures by more fake keys in the wild, on the keyservers. [1] All these keys have same short-IDs, created by collision attacks, led with some discussions about the danger of short-IDs. Now, it is worth to mention this issue again, since fake keys of Linus Torvalds, Greg Kroah-Hartman, and other kernel devs are found in the wild recently. > We don't know who is behind this, or what his purpose is. We just know this > looks very evil. Search Result of 0x00411886: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=0x00411886&op=index Fake Linus Torvalds: 0F6A 1465 32D8 69AE E438 F74B 6211 AA3B [0041 1886] Real Linus Torvalds: ABAF 11C6 5A29 70B1 30AB E3C4 79BE 3E43 [0041 1886] Search Result of 0x6092693E: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=0x6092693E&op=index Fake Greg Kroah-Hartman: 497C 48CE 16B9 26E9 3F49 6301 2736 5DEA [6092 693E] Real Greg Kroah-Hartman: 647F 2865 4894 E3BD 4571 99BE 38DB BDC8 [6092 693E] Everyone, > In short, that cutting a fingerprint in order to get a (32- or 64-bit) short > key ID is the worst of all worlds, and we should rather target either always > showing full fingerprints, or not showing it at all > (and leaving all the crypto-checking bits to be done by the software, as comparing > 160-bit strings is not natural for us humans). - Gunnar Wolf DO NOT TRUST ANYTHING SHORTER THAN THE FINGERPRINTS. [0] http://www.asheesh.org/note/debian/short-key-ids-are-bad-news.html [1] http://gwolf.org/node/4070