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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:50:15 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when
 SEV is active
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 09:33:00PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> How is this even possible? The spec clearly says under SEV only in long mode
> or PAE mode guest can control whether memory is encrypted via c-bit, and in
> other modes guest will be always in encrypted mode.

I was suggesting the hypervisor supplies the EFI ranges unencrypted. But
that is not a good idea because firmware data is exposed then, see same
thread from yesterday.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
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