From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 11:46:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161116104656.qz5wp33zzyja373r@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003610.3280.22043.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
Btw, for your next submission, this patch can be split in two exactly
like the commit message paragraphs are:
On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:36:10PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
> the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
> encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
> an encrypted or un-encrypted memory area is in the proper state (for
> example the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
> encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
Patch 2: users of the new memmap change
> The early_memmap support is enhanced to specify encrypted and un-encrypted
> mappings with and without write-protection. The use of write-protection is
> necessary when encrypting data "in place". The write-protect attribute is
> considered cacheable for loads, but not stores. This implies that the
> hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype.
Patch 1: change memmap
This makes this aspect of the patchset much clearer and is better for
bisection.
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 9 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 +++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 8 +++
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 28 +++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h | 2 +
> mm/early_ioremap.c | 15 +++++
> 7 files changed, 179 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index d642cc5..06235b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
>
> +#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> +#include <asm/fixmap.h>
> +
> extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>
> /*
> @@ -24,6 +27,105 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>
> +/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
> +static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +/*
> + * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
> + * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> + * meant to be accessed as encrypted but the contents are currently not
> + * encrypted.
> + */
> +void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + void *src, *dst;
> + size_t len;
> +
> + if (!sme_me_mask)
> + return;
> +
> + local_flush_tlb();
> + wbinvd();
> +
> + /*
> + * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
> + * one page at time.
> + */
> + while (size) {
> + len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
> +
> + /* Create a mapping for non-encrypted write-protected memory */
> + src = early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len);
> +
> + /* Create a mapping for encrypted memory */
> + dst = early_memremap_enc(paddr, len);
> +
> + /*
> + * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the encryption,
> + * then encrypted access to that area will end up causing
> + * a crash.
> + */
> + BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
> +
> + memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
> + memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
I still am missing the short explanation why we need the temporary buffer.
Oh, and we can save us the code duplication a little. Diff ontop of yours:
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 06235b477d7c..50e2c4fc7338 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
* meant to be accessed as encrypted but the contents are currently not
* encrypted.
*/
-void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+static void __init noinline
+__mem_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
{
void *src, *dst;
size_t len;
@@ -54,15 +55,15 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
while (size) {
len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
- /* Create a mapping for non-encrypted write-protected memory */
- src = early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len);
+ src = (enc ? early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len)
+ : early_memremap_enc_wp(paddr, len));
- /* Create a mapping for encrypted memory */
- dst = early_memremap_enc(paddr, len);
+ dst = (enc ? early_memremap_enc(paddr, len)
+ : early_memremap_dec(paddr, len));
/*
- * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the encryption,
- * then encrypted access to that area will end up causing
+ * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the dec/encryption,
+ * then (un-)encrypted access to that area will end up causing
* a crash.
*/
BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
@@ -78,52 +79,14 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
}
}
-/*
- * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
- * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
- * meant to be accessed as not encrypted but the contents are currently
- * encrypted.
- */
-void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
{
- void *src, *dst;
- size_t len;
-
- if (!sme_me_mask)
- return;
-
- local_flush_tlb();
- wbinvd();
-
- /*
- * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
- * one page at time.
- */
- while (size) {
- len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
-
- /* Create a mapping for encrypted write-protected memory */
- src = early_memremap_enc_wp(paddr, len);
-
- /* Create a mapping for non-encrypted memory */
- dst = early_memremap_dec(paddr, len);
-
- /*
- * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the decryption,
- * then un-encrypted access to that area will end up causing
- * a crash.
- */
- BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
-
- memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
- memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
-
- early_memunmap(dst, len);
- early_memunmap(src, len);
+ return __mem_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
+}
- paddr += len;
- size -= len;
- }
+void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ return __mem_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
}
void __init sme_early_init(void)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-16 10:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-10 0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 1:26 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 12:10 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-11-16 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 12:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-14 16:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-12-07 13:19 ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-21 8:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 18:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 20:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-24 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56 ` Borislav Petkov
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