From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, Steve@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] audit: log 32-bit socketcalls
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 22:53:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170117035307.GA1095@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQsL7c=dAd4ZyTbEugkcrNuaxGNnaOi8oMkn=NCwuVoHA@mail.gmail.com>
On 2017-01-16 15:04, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 13, 2017 at 9:42 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-01-13 at 04:51 -0500, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> >> index 9d4443f..43d8003 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -387,6 +387,18 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall(int nargs,
> >> unsigned long *args)
> >> return __audit_socketcall(nargs, args);
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >> +static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32 *args)
> >> +{
> >> + if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) {
> >
> > I've always hated these likely/unlikely. Mostly because I think they
> > are so often wrong. I believe this says that you compiled audit in but
> > you expect it to be explicitly disabled. While that is (recently) true
> > in Fedora I highly doubt that's true on the vast majority of systems
> > that have audit compiled in.
>
> Richard and I have talked about the likely/unlikely optimization
> before and I know Richard likes to use them, but I don't for the
> reasons Eric has already mentioned. Richard, since you're respinning
> the patch, go ahead and yank out the unlikely() call.
I don't "like to use them". I'm simply following the use and style of
existing code and the arguments of others in places of critical
performance. If I "fix" that one, then I would feel compelled to yank
out the one in the function immediately above, audit_socketcall() for
consistency to ease my conscience. Eric conceded that argument.
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-17 3:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-13 9:51 Richard Guy Briggs
2017-01-13 14:42 ` Eric Paris
2017-01-13 15:06 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-01-13 15:18 ` Eric Paris
2017-01-13 15:20 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-01-16 20:04 ` Paul Moore
2017-01-17 3:53 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2017-01-17 13:29 ` Paul Moore
2017-01-16 18:27 ` David Miller
2017-01-16 20:38 ` Paul Moore
2017-01-16 21:55 ` David Miller
2017-01-17 4:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs
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