From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl
Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2017 02:07:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170417060706.28674-4-matt@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170417060706.28674-1-matt@nmatt.com>
this patch depends on patch 1 and 2
enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
into other processes in the same tty session using the TIOCSTI ioctl
Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
---
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index e6d1a65..31894e8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -2296,11 +2296,15 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
* FIXME: may race normal receive processing
*/
+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
+
static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
{
char ch, mbz = 0;
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+ if (tiocsti_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ch, p))
--
2.10.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-17 6:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-17 6:07 Patchset to Restrict Unprivileged TIOCSTI TTY Command Injection Matt Brown
2017-04-17 6:07 ` [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config Matt Brown
2017-04-17 6:50 ` Greg KH
2017-04-18 4:29 ` Matt Brown
2017-04-18 13:40 ` Alan Cox
2017-04-18 15:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-17 6:07 ` [PATCH 2/4] add tiocsti_restrict variable Matt Brown
2017-04-17 6:51 ` Greg KH
2017-04-17 6:07 ` Matt Brown [this message]
2017-04-17 6:53 ` [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl Greg KH
2017-04-17 14:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-04-17 16:18 ` Matt Brown
2017-04-17 6:07 ` [PATCH 4/4] added kernel.tiocsti_restrict sysctl Matt Brown
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