mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: serge@hallyn.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jslaby@suse.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com,
	keescook@chromium.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 1/2] security: tty: Add owner user namespace to tty_struct
Date: Fri,  5 May 2017 19:20:17 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170505232018.28846-2-matt@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170505232018.28846-1-matt@nmatt.com>

This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.

This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
namespace that allocated the tty.

E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)

This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
ioctls such as TIOCSTI.

See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
---
 drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 2 ++
 include/linux/tty.h  | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index e6d1a65..c276814 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	put_device(tty->dev);
 	kfree(tty->write_buf);
 	tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
+	put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
 	kfree(tty);
 }
 
@@ -3191,6 +3192,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
 	tty->index = idx;
 	tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
 	tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
+	tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
 
 	return tty;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index 1017e904..d902d42 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/llist.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 
 /*
@@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
 	/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
 	struct work_struct SAK_work;
 	struct tty_port *port;
+	struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
 };
 
 /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
-- 
2.10.2

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-05 23:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-05 23:20 [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown [this message]
2017-05-05 23:20 ` [PATCH v6 2/2] " Matt Brown
2017-05-18 13:31   ` Greg KH
2017-05-19  4:51     ` Matt Brown
2017-05-10 20:29 ` [PATCH v6 0/2] " Alan Cox
2017-05-10 21:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-13 19:52   ` Matt Brown
2017-05-15 20:57     ` Alan Cox
2017-05-15 23:10       ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16  4:15         ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16  9:01           ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 12:22             ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 14:28               ` Kees Cook
2017-05-16 15:48                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-16 22:05                   ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:43                 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:54                   ` Matt Brown
2017-05-17 16:41                 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-17 18:25                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-18  3:18                     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-19  2:48                       ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-19 14:33                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-29 10:42                           ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-30 15:52                             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-30 21:52                               ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 11:27                                 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-31 14:36                                   ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:32                                     ` Serge E. Hallyn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170505232018.28846-2-matt@nmatt.com \
    --to=matt@nmatt.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=jslaby@suse.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome