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Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 15:43:17 +0100
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of
 struct list_head
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> I saw several companies who ship their embedded devices with
> single-function LSM modules (e.g. restrict only mount operation and
> ptrace operation). What is unfortunate is that their LSM modules had
> never been proposed for upstream, and thus bugs remained unnoticed.

So which of them cannot be done with seccomp ? We have a small tight
interface for simple things like restricting a few calls.
 
> via lack of ability to use LKM-based LSM modules). My customers cannot afford
> enabling SELinux, but my customers cannot rebuild their kernels because
> rebuilding makes it even more difficult to get help from support centers.

And "I've loaded this third party module" doesn't ?

Alan