From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753878AbdHQXYW (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Aug 2017 19:24:22 -0400 Received: from mail-pg0-f66.google.com ([74.125.83.66]:36413 "EHLO mail-pg0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753698AbdHQXYV (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Aug 2017 19:24:21 -0400 Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 08:24:37 +0900 From: Sergey Senozhatsky To: Kees Cook Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky , LKML , Nick Kralevich , Sebastian Schmidt , Tony Luck , Anton Vorontsov , Colin Cross , Petr Mladek , Sergey Senozhatsky , Steven Rostedt , Patrick Tjin , Mark Salyzyn Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Revert "pstore: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps" Message-ID: <20170817232437.GB575@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain> References: <1502397395-118652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1502397395-118652-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <20170816075922.GC522@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain> <20170817012947.GB20907@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.8.3 (2017-05-23) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hello, On (08/17/17 16:01), Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Sergey Senozhatsky > wrote: > > can we accidentally "leak" kernel pointers or some other critical > > info? kptr_restrict requires CAP_SYSLOG and pstore read used to > > require CAP_SYSLOG, but it seems that now we can bypass it by > > letting "entirely unprivileged groups" to read pstore. is there > > something to be concerned about (or at least mention it in the > > commit messages)? > > I can expand the commit message a bit more, sure. that would be lovely. please do. > There may be sensitive things in pstorefs, and it's up to a system builder > to decide how they want to deal with that risk. Most users of pstore > don't mount with update_ms=N so pstorefs contains (mostly) old > addresses. I see... > Without this change, though, a builder can't give permissions to an > unprivileged crash dump process without also giving it CAP_SYSLOG which > has much MORE privilege that it would need (reading and wiping _current_ > dmesg, for example). ok, the "CAP_SYSLOG and _current_ dmesg" point is surely interesting. could you please also add this to the commit message? FWIW, both patches Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky -ss