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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"\\\"Radim Krčmář\\\"" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 16/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 19:55:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170913175537.wlfk3tmipx3xtbun@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724200303.12197-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 03:02:53PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM
> encryption key (VEK) created during LAUNCH_START.

Yap, this is one good commit message!

:-)

> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 165 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 3e325578..91b070f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
>  #include <linux/frame.h>
>  #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
>  #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/swap.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/apic.h>
>  #include <asm/perf_event.h>
> @@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static int sev_asid_new(void);
>  static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
>  static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
>  static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
> +#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
>  
>  static bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
>  {
> @@ -5796,6 +5799,164 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static struct page **sev_pin_memory(unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long ulen,
> +				    unsigned long *n, int write)
> +{
> +	unsigned long npages, pinned, size;
> +	struct page **pages;
> +	int first, last;
> +
> +	/* Get number of pages */
> +	first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	npages = (last - first + 1);
> +
> +	/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffer */
> +	size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
> +	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
> +		pages = vmalloc(size);
> +	else
> +		pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> +	if (!pages)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	/* pin the user virtual address */
> +	pinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
> +					pages);

Let it stick out.

> +	if (pinned != npages) {
> +		pr_err("failed to pin %ld pages (got %ld)\n", npages, pinned);
> +		goto err;
> +	}
> +
> +	*n = npages;
> +	return pages;
> +err:
> +	if (pinned > 0)
> +		release_pages(pages, pinned, 0);

<---- newline here.

> +	kvfree(pages);
> +
> +	return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages)
> +{
> +	release_pages(pages, npages, 0);
> +	kvfree(pages);
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
> +{
> +	uint8_t *page_virtual;
> +	unsigned long i;
> +
> +	if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
> +		return;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
> +		page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
> +		clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
> +		kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
> +				unsigned long npages)
> +{
> +	int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
> +	unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
> +
> +	/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
> +	paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
> +	while (i < npages) {
> +		next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
> +		if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
> +			pages++;
> +			paddr = next_paddr;
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	return pages;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
> +	struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
> +	struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
> +	struct page **inpages;
> +	int i, ret, pages;
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +		return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void *)argp->data,
> +			sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data)))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!data)
> +		return -ENOMEM;

Same issues as before.

> +
> +	vaddr = params.address;
> +	size = params.length;
> +	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
> +
> +	/* lock the user memory */
> +	inpages = sev_pin_memory(vaddr, size, &npages, 1);

This way user basically controls how many pages to pin and you need to
limit that on the upper end.

> +	if (!inpages) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto e_free;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * invalidate the cache to ensure that DRAM has recent content before

recent content?

> +	 * calling the SEV commands.
> +	 */
> +	sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
> +
> +	for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
> +		int offset, len;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
> +		 * offset within the page.
> +		 */
> +		offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go
> +		 */
> +		pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
> +
> +		len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
> +
> +		data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
> +		data->length = len;
> +		data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
> +		ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data,
> +				&argp->error);

Yah, let it stick out.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-09-13 17:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 20:02 [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 00/26] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 01/26] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 17:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-05 21:39     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 22:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 02/26] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  8:29   ` Kamil Konieczny
2017-07-25 15:00     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 17:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:38     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 20:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 21:26         ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-07 10:34           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 14:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 22:19     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-07 23:15       ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-08  8:22         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08  8:40       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08 13:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-08 16:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 03/26] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 14:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 15:32     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 04/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 19:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 05/26] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 06/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 07/26] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 08/26] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 09/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 10/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_RAM ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:50     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 21:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 11/26] KVM: X86: Extend struct kvm_arch to include SEV information Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:14     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 12/26] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 13/26] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 16:23     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 16:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 14/26] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use assosiated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 15/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:23     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 18:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:58         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 16/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:55   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-09-13 19:45     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 17/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 18/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 19/26] KVM: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-14 11:25     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 20/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 11:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 21/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 13:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 22/26] KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 23/26] KVM: X86: Add memory encryption enabled ops Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 24/26] KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 25/26] KVM: SVM: Do not install #UD intercept when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 26/26] KVM: X86: Restart the guest when insn_len is zero and " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov

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