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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "KVM list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim KrĠmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 11:02:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171116100222.k3zic3ut3ectnaly@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+d-jZxAooyQAE3U-EWELnoNX01yxo1ZEnr8H6vKkVYC6A@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 15, 2017 at 03:57:13PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> One piece that seems missing here is the handling of the vmm
> communication exception. What's the plan for non-automatic exits? In
> particular, what's the plan for emulated devices that are currently
> accessed through MMIO (e.g. the IOAPIC)?

First of all, please do not top-post.

Then, maybe this would answer some of your questions:

http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/Protecting%20VM%20Register%20State%20with%20SEV-ES.pdf

But I'd look in Tom's direction for further comments.

> Maybe I'm getting ahead of myself: What's the testing story? (since I
> don't think linux would boot with these patches, I'm curious what you
> are doing to ensure these pieces work)

Seems to boot fine here :)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-16 10:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-20 14:30 Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:42   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 18:39   ` Alan Cox
2017-10-21 11:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-11-15 23:57 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Steve Rutherford
2017-11-16 10:02   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-11-16 14:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-11-21 23:18       ` Steve Rutherford

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