From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753027AbdK1Wsz (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Nov 2017 17:48:55 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:41789 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752600AbdK1Wsx (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Nov 2017 17:48:53 -0500 Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 23:48:49 +0100 From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" To: Kees Cook Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" , Djalal Harouni , Andy Lutomirski , Andrew Morton , James Morris , Ben Hutchings , Solar Designer , Serge Hallyn , Jessica Yu , Rusty Russell , LKML , linux-security-module , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Jonathan Corbet , Ingo Molnar , "David S. Miller" , Network Development , Peter Zijlstra , Linus Torvalds Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap() Message-ID: <20171128224849.GT729@wotan.suse.de> References: <1511803118-2552-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> <1511803118-2552-2-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> <20171128191405.GO729@wotan.suse.de> <20171128211659.GP729@wotan.suse.de> <20171128221237.GR729@wotan.suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.6.0 (2016-04-01) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 02:18:18PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 01:39:58PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 1:16 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote: > >> > And *all* auto-loading uses aliases? What's the difference between auto-loading > >> > and direct-loading? > >> > >> The difference is the process privileges. Unprivilged autoloading > >> (e.g. int n_hdlc = N_HDLC; ioctl(fd, > >> TIOCSETD, &n_hdlc)), triggers a privileged call to finit_module() > >> under CAP_SYS_MODULE. > > > > Ah, so system call implicated request_module() calls. > > Yup. Unprivileged user does something that ultimately hits a > request_module() in the kernel. Then the kernel calls out with the > usermode helper (which has CAP_SYS_MODULE) and calls finit_module(). Thanks, using this terminology is much better to understand than auto-loading, given it does make it clear an unprivileged call was one that initiated the request_module() call, there are many uses of request_module() which *are* privileged. > > OK and since CAP_SYS_MODULE is much more restrictive one could argue, what's the > > point here? > > The goal is to block an unprivileged user from being able to trigger a > module load without blocking root from loading modules directly. I see now. Do we have an audit of all system calls which implicate a request_module() call? Networking is a good example for sure to start off with but I was curious if we have a grasp of how wide spread this could be. I'll go review the patches again now with all this in mind. Luis