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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2017 01:20:58 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171228001931.GA15868@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Tue, Dec 26, 2017 at 11:43:54PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
> page table isolation feature protects against.  The AMD microarchitecture
> does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
> access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
> when that access would result in a page fault.
> 
> Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
> the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
> is set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |    4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index c47de4e..7d9e3b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -923,8 +923,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  
>  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
>  
> -	/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
> -	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
> +	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
> +		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
>  
>  	fpu__init_system(c);

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-28  0:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-27  5:43 Tom Lendacky
2017-12-27  8:48 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-27 14:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-12-28  0:20 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2018-01-03 16:21 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2018-02-12 15:26 ` [PATCH] " Pavel Machek
2018-02-12 15:37   ` Brian Gerst
2018-02-13 13:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-03 11:07 Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-03 19:38 Tim Mouraveiko

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