From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753265AbeADVJw (ORCPT + 1 other); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 16:09:52 -0500 Received: from wind.enjellic.com ([76.10.64.91]:53017 "EHLO wind.enjellic.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753089AbeADVJu (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 16:09:50 -0500 Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:09:06 -0600 From: "Dr. Greg Wettstein" Message-Id: <201801042109.w04L961C032047@wind.enjellic.com> In-Reply-To: Greg Kroah-Hartman "Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver" (Jan 4, 3:27pm) Reply-To: greg@enjellic.com X-Mailer: Mail User's Shell (7.2.6-ESD1.0 03/31/2012) To: Greg Kroah-Hartman , Cedric Blancher Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , Borislav Petkov , "David S. Miller" , Grzegorz Andrejczuk , Haim Cohen , Ingo Molnar , Janakarajan Natarajan , Jim Mattson , Kan Liang , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Kyle Huey , Len Brown , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Paolo Bonzini , Piotr Luc , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Randy Dunlap , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Tom Lendacky , Vikas Shivappa X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.3 (wind.enjellic.com [0.0.0.0]); Thu, 04 Jan 2018 15:09:08 -0600 (CST) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Jan 4, 3:27pm, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: } Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver Wild day, enjoyed by all I'm sure. > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 03:17:24PM +0100, Cedric Blancher wrote: > > So how does this protect against the MELTDOWN attack (CVE-2017-5754) > > and the MELTATOMBOMBA4 worm which uses this exploit? > It has nothing to do with it at all, sorry. Precision seems to be everything in these discussions. Since SGX obviously does not mitigate micro-architectural state probing it is not an effective general remediation against MELTDOWN. Does your statement indicate there is solid documentation that MELTDOWN can be used by a process of any privilege level to dump out the unencrypted contents of an initialized enclave? That would obviously be a big story as well. > greg k-h Have a good evening. Greg }-- End of excerpt from Greg Kroah-Hartman As always, Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC. 4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra-structure Fargo, ND 58102 development. PH: 701-281-1686 FAX: 701-281-3949 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "If you get to thinkin' you're a person of some influence, try orderin' somebody else's dog around." -- Cowboy Wisdom