From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 16:11:50 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Tom Lendacky Cc: Gabriel C , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, Brijesh Singh , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] x86: SME: BSP/SME microcode update fix Message-ID: <20180119151150.GB9033@kroah.com> References: <20180110192544.6026.17285.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20180111183313.7ub2t3xkeko5yb3z@pd.tnic> <68544677-2cbc-b41e-2db0-5799ef84d592@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.2 (2017-12-15) X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 09:03:52AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 1/15/2018 4:47 PM, Gabriel C wrote: > > On 11.01.2018 19:33, Borislav Petkov wrote: > >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 01:25:45PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote: > >>> This patch series addresses an issue when SME is active and the BSP > >>> is attempting to check for and load microcode during load_ucode_bsp(). > >>> Since the initrd has not been decrypted (yet) and the virtual address > >>> of the initrd treats the memory as encrypted, the CPIO archive parsing > >>> fails to locate the microcode. > >>> > >>> This series moves the encryption of the initrd into the early boot code > >>> and encrypts it at the same time that the kernel is encrypted.  Since > >>> the initrd is now encrypted, the CPIO archive parsing succeeds in > >>> properly locating the microcode. > >>> > >>> The following patches are included in this fix: > >>> - Cleanup register saving in arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S > >>> - Reduce parameters and complexity for creating the SME PGD mappings > >>> - Centralize the use of the PMD flags used in sme_encrypt_kernel() in > >>>    preparation for using PTE flags also. > >>> - Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() to handle PAGE aligned encryption, not > >>>    just 2MB large page aligned encryption. > >>> - Encrypt the initrd in sme_encrypt_kernel() when the kernel is being > >>>    encrypted. > >>> > >>> This patch series is based on tip/master. > >>> > >>> --- > >>> > >>> Changes from v2: > >>> - General code cleanup based on feedback. > >>> > >>> Changes from v1: > >>> - Additional patch to cleanup the register saving performed in > >>>    arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S in prep for changes made in the > >>>    remainder of the patchset. > >>> - Additional patch to reduce parameters and complexity for creating the > >>>    SME PGD mappings by introducing and using a structure for referencing > >>>    the PGD to populate, the pagetable allocation area, the > >>> virtual/physical > >>>    addresses being mapped and the pagetable flags to be used. > >>> - Consolidate PMD/PTE mapping code to reduce duplication. > >>> > >>> Tom Lendacky (5): > >>>        x86/mm: Cleanup register saving in mem_encrypt_boot.S > >>>        x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping > >>>        x86/mm: Centralize PMD flags in sme_encrypt_kernel() > >>>        x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption > >>>        x86/mm: Encrypt the initrd earlier for BSP microcode update > >>> > >>> > >>>   arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    4 > >>>   arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 > >>>   arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |   10 - > >>>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |  356 > >>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- > >>>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S     |   80 ++++---- > >>>   5 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-) > >> > >> All 5: > >> > >> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov > >> > > > > Guys , are these patches going to be part of 4.15 ? > > > > With mem_encrypt=on without these patches microcode loading doesn't > > work right. Also @stable 4.14 would need the fixes too. > > It looks like these patches have been pulled into 4.15. I did forget > to cc stable, so I'll follow-up with a separate email to have these > back-ported to the 4.14 stable tree. What are the git commit ids? That's all I need :) thanks, greg k-h