From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 12:15:08 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180131091509.26531-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180131091509.26531-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
IA32_TME_ACTIVATE MSR (0x982) can be used to check if BIOS has enabled
TME and MKTME. It includes which encryption policy/algorithm is selected
for TME or available for MKTME. For MKTME, the MSR also enumerates how
many KeyIDs are available.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 6936d14d4c77..5b95fa484837 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -517,6 +517,86 @@ static void detect_vmx_virtcap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1)
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2)
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS 0
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS 1
+
+#define MKTME_ENABLED 0
+#define MKTME_DISABLED 1
+#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2
+static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
+ int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
+ static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
+
+ if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+ /* Broken BIOS? */
+ if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
+ pr_err_once("TME: configuation is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
+
+ if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
+ pr_info("TME: not enabled by BIOS\n");
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("TME: enabled by BIOS\n");
+
+ tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
+ if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS)
+ pr_warn("TME: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
+
+ tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
+ if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS)) {
+ pr_err("MKTME: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
+ tme_crypto_algs);
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+ }
+out:
+ keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
+ nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
+ if (nr_keyids) {
+ pr_info_once("MKTME: enabled by BIOS\n");
+ pr_info_once("MKTME: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
+ } else {
+ pr_info_once("MKTME: disabled by BIOS\n");
+ }
+
+ if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+ /* MKTME is usable */
+ mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Exclude KeyID bits from physical address bits.
+ *
+ * We have to do this even if we are not going to use KeyID bits
+ * ourself. VM guests still have to know that these bits are not usable
+ * for physical address.
+ */
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
+}
+
static void init_intel_energy_perf(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 epb;
@@ -687,6 +767,9 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
detect_vmx_virtcap(c);
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
+ detect_tme(c);
+
init_intel_energy_perf(c);
init_intel_misc_features(c);
--
2.15.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-31 9:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-31 9:15 [PATCH 0/3] Enumerate TME and PCONFIG Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-31 9:15 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-31 9:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-02-07 4:34 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS Kai Huang
2018-02-07 8:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-07 11:00 ` Kai Huang
2018-02-07 11:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-31 9:15 ` [PATCH 3/3] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
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