From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 03/64] powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:22:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182138.714615532@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org>
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
commit 236003e6b5443c45c18e613d2b0d776a9f87540e upstream.
Expose the state of the RFI flush (enabled/disabled) via debugfs, and
allow it to be enabled/disabled at runtime.
eg: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
1
$ echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
$ cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
0
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <asm/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/kdump.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
@@ -885,6 +886,35 @@ void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flu
rfi_flush_enable(enable);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ if (val == 1)
+ rfi_flush_enable(true);
+ else if (val == 0)
+ rfi_flush_enable(false);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+ *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
+#endif
+
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (rfi_flush)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/64] scripts/faddr2line: fix CROSS_COMPILE unset error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/64] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/64] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/64] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/64] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/64] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/64] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/64] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/64] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/64] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/64] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/64] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/64] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/64] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/64] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/64] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/64] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/64] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/64] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/64] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/64] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/64] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/64] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/64] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/64] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/64] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/64] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/64] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/64] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/64] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/64] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/64] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/64] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/64] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/64] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/64] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/64] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/64] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/64] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/64] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/64] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/64] KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/64] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/64] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/64] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/64] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/64] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/64] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 22:13 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-05 23:55 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-06 0:36 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
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